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Geyh: The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality

THE DIMENSIONS OF JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY
Charles Gardner Geyh∗
Abstract
Scholars have traditionally analyzed judicial impartiality piecemeal,
in disconnected debates on discrete topics. As a consequence, current
understandings of judicial impartiality are balkanized and muddled.
This Article seeks to reconceptualize judicial impartiality
comprehensively, across contexts. In an era when “we are all legal
realists now,” perfect impartiality—the complete absence of bias or
prejudice—is at most an ideal; “impartial enough” has, of necessity,
become the realistic goal. Understanding when imperfectly impartial is
nonetheless impartial enough is aided by conceptualizing judicial
impartiality in three distinct dimensions: a procedural dimension, in
which impartiality affords parties a fair hearing; a political dimension,
in which impartiality promotes public confidence in the courts; and an
ethical dimension, in which impartiality is a standard of good conduct
core to a judge’s self-definition. The seeming contradictions that cut
across contexts in which judicial impartiality problems arise can, for the
most part, be explained with reference to the dimensions those problems
inhabit and the constraints to which regulation in those dimensions are
subject. Thus, what is impartial enough to assure parties a fair hearing
in the procedural dimension may or may not be impartial enough to
satisfy the public in the political dimension, which may or may not be
impartial enough to ensure that judges are behaving honorably in the
ethical dimension. Analyzing partiality problems through the lens of the
dimensions they occupy not only resolves many of the imponderables
that have long plagued the subject, but also reveals a distinct trend—
impartiality is being transformed, from a value traditionally regulated
largely by judges and the legal establishment in the procedural and
ethical dimensions, to one that is increasingly the province of the
political dimension, where it is regulated by the public and its elected
representatives. By situating impartiality at the crossroads of judicial
procedure, ethics, and politics, this Article offers a new perspective, not
just on judicial impartiality, but also on the role of the American
judiciary in the administration of justice and the political process.
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INTRODUCTION
“Judicial impartiality” is a feel-good term, like “puppies” and “pie,”
that no decent soul would denigrate. Like “judicial independence,”
judicial impartiality is ubiquitous. It is used and abused in myriad ways:
to make legal arguments, score political points, exhort judges, and
reassure the public. Unlike judicial independence, however—which has
been exhaustively analyzed, theorized, canonized, and eulogized in
books, edited volumes, reports, academic conferences, and articles—
judicial impartiality has received no systematic attention. There have
been targeted efforts to evaluate when a judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned for purposes of judicial disqualification;1
1. See, e.g., Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s
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when the need for judicial impartiality justifies various ethics
restrictions on judicial speech, association, and conduct;2 and when
adjudicators run afoul of the Due Process Clause for being actually,
probably, or apparently partial.3 Missing from the literature is any
sustained effort to conceptualize impartiality broadly in relation to its
multiplicity of applications.
As a consequence of being undertheorized and haphazardly
analyzed, judicial impartiality has stumbled its way into a series of
holes, imponderables, and seeming contradictions:
• In 1974, author Lillian Hellman wrote that “[n]obody outside of a
baby carriage or a Judge’s chamber can believe in an unprejudiced point
of view.”4 As jaded as she may have meant to sound nearly four
decades ago, in a skeptical age when social science research has
debunked the notion that judges entertain an “unprejudiced point of
view,” the distinction she drew between judges and the general
population seems almost naïve. Is the realm of the impartial now
peopled only with infants—is judicial impartiality a fiction, or worse, a
scam?
• Vaughn Walker, a gay district court judge, invalidated California’s
Proposition 8, which outlawed same-sex marriage.5 Under the federal
disqualification statute, Judge Walker’s sexual orientation did not
furnish a reasonable basis to question his impartiality.6 On the other
hand, if Judge Walker owned a single share of stock in a corporation
that intervened to defend Proposition 8, he would have had to disqualify
himself immediately.7 Is it more likely that Judge Walker’s nominal
shareholding would incline him to uphold Proposition 8, than that a
lifetime of discrimination as a gay man would incline him to invalidate
it?

Impartiality “Might Reasonably Be Questioned,” 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55 (2000); Jeffrey
W. Stempel, In Praise of Procedurally Centered Judicial Disqualification—and a Stronger
Conception of the Appearance Standard: Better Acknowledging and Adjusting to Cognitive
Bias, Spoliation, and Perceptual Realities, 30 REV. LITIG. 733 (2011).
2. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: What are
the Alternatives?, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1327 (2008); Developments in the Law: Voting and
Democracy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1127 (2006).
3. See, e.g., Penny J. White, Relinquished Responsibilities, 123 HARV. L. REV. 120
(2009).
4. Lillian Hellman, Love Letters, Some Not So Loving, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1974,
http://www.nytimes.com/books/00/09/10/specials/west-ray.html.
5. Lisa Leff, U.S. Court Rules Recusal of Gay Judge Not Necessary: Legal Battle on
California’s Prop 8 Continues, HOUS. CHRON., June 15, 2011, at A5.
6. See id.
7. 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(b)(4), (d)(4) (2006) (requiring disqualification when a judge “has a
financial interest in . . . a party to the proceeding,” and defining “financial interest” as
“ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small”).
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• In 2002, the U.S. Senate blocked President George W. Bush’s
nomination of District Judge Charles Pickering to the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals on the grounds that his ideologically conservative
views fueled doubts among interest groups and Senate Democrats that
he would impartially uphold the law;8 and yet, upon returning to his
duties as a district court judge, it would have been frivolous for parties
to seek Judge Pickering’s disqualification on the grounds that his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.9 Why the double standard?
• Minnesota’s Code of Judicial Conduct included an ethics rule that
forbade judicial candidates from announcing their views on issues that
they would likely decide as judges—a rule the state defended as
necessary to preserve judicial impartiality.10 Justice Antonin Scalia,
writing for the Supreme Court in 2002, emphatically rejected the view
that impartiality meant a “lack of preconception in favor of or against a
particular legal view,” on his way to invalidating the rule on First
Amendment grounds.11 Yet sixteen years earlier, then-nominee Judge
Scalia refused to announce his legal views to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, explaining:
[T]he only way to be sure that I am not impairing my
ability to be impartial, and to be regarded as impartial in
future cases before the Court, is simply to respectfully
decline to give an opinion on whether any of the existing
law on the Supreme Court is right, or wrong.12
Was Justice Scalia being duplicitous, or was something else going on?
• In the seventeenth century, Sir Matthew Hale devised a code of
judicial conduct for his own use, which included a rule stating: “That I
never engage myself in the beginning of any cause, but reserve myself
unprejudiced till the whole be heard.”13 More recently, however, the
8. See Darryl Fears, Nominee’s Past Opens Old Wounds; Appeals Court Pick Raises
Tempers, Divides Blacks, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2002, at A5 (discussing opposition to Judge
Pickering in terms of his ideology compromising his impartiality); Charles Hurt, Senators Send
a Signal, Reject Judicial Pick in Voting down a Conservative Judge for an Appeals Court Seat,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 15, 2002, at A2 (reporting on Senate Judiciary Committee rejection of
Judge Pickering).
9. RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF
JUDGES § 10.7 (2d ed. 2007) (noting that there is a “strong presumption against disqualifying a
judge” solely on the basis of the judge’s judicial philosophy or views on matters of public
policy).
10. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768–75 (2002).
11. Id. at 777–78.
12. Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 58 (1986)
(statement of Antonin Scalia, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit).
13. 2 LORD CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 208 (1881).
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U.S. Supreme Court has directed judges not to postpone judgment,
given the expense of discovery, but to dismiss complaints at the
beginning of any cause that judges deem “implausible” in light of their
“common sense” and “experience.”14 Is impartiality becoming
expendable?
In Part I, I seek to isolate persistent problems with judicial partiality
as they have been described and discussed in popular culture, to the end
of illustrating the various ways in which judicial impartiality has been
conceptualized. The goal is to define impartiality and its converse in
functional rather than legal terms: partiality is as partiality does. Over
time, authors of novels, poems, disquisitions, and polemics have
identified a sprawling array of behaviors as antithetical to judicial
impartiality. A synthesis of these illustrations yields a typology that
helps to delineate the scope of judicial partiality as it has traditionally
been understood.
A critical insight in Part I is that traditional understandings of
judicial impartiality do not include the naïve assumption that judges are
devoid of bias. Judges have long been characterized as human beings
subject to human prejudices—a characterization that has gained
currency in the aftermath of the legal realism movement. If perfect
impartiality is unattainable, the more pragmatic objective is to ensure
that judges are “impartial enough” to fulfill the role assigned them
under state and federal constitutions: to uphold the rule of law. How
impartial is impartial enough to preserve the rule of law, however,
depends on who one asks and why they care.
In Part II, I argue that there are three beneficiaries of an impartial
judiciary, each with different interests, who occupy three distinct
dimensions of judicial impartiality: (1) parties to ligation, who seek a
fair hearing from an impartial judge, in a “procedural dimension” of
impartiality; (2) the public, for whom the institutional legitimacy of the
judiciary depends on the impartiality of its judges, in a “political
dimension” of impartiality; and (3) judges themselves, who take an oath
to be impartial and for whom impartiality is a standard of conduct that is
core to their self-definition, in an “ethical dimension” of impartiality.
In Part III, I describe the different mechanisms for managing
impartiality in the procedural, ethical, and political dimensions, to the
end of reconceptualizing how impartiality is regulated. The differing
objectives of each dimension, and the varying constraints under which
each dimension operates, yield perspectives unique to each dimension
on how judicial partiality problems should be managed.

14. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 593–95 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2014

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 4

498

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

Part IV then returns to the imponderables enumerated in the opening
paragraphs of this Article, which ultimately become ponderable, when
evaluated with reference to the dynamic, tripartite schema developed
here. Reanalyzing these developments reveals a distinct trend, in which
the scope of procedural and ethical impartiality is shrinking, while the
reach of political impartiality is correspondingly expanding. The net
effect is not, as some commentators have argued, that impartiality is
under siege or diminishing; rather, impartiality is being transformed,
from a value traditionally regulated in large part by judges and the legal
establishment in the procedural and ethical dimensions, to one that is
increasingly the province of the political dimension, where it is subject
to regulation by the public and their elected representatives. The threedimensional construct developed here thus offers a new perspective on
longstanding claims that the judiciary has become overly politicized,
and, in so doing, illuminates approaches to reform.
I. PERSISTENT PARTIALITY PROBLEMS
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “impartial” as “[n]ot partial;
not favouring one party or side more than another; unprejudiced,
unbiased, fair, just, equitable.”15 Conversely, “partial” is defined as
“unduly favouring one party or side in a suit or controversy, or one set
or class of persons rather than another; prejudicied; biased; interested;
unfair.”16 “Bias,” in turn, is defined as “[a]n inclination, leaning,
tendency, bent; a preponderating disposition or propensity;
predisposition towards; predilection; prejudice.”17 Finally, the Oxford
English Dictionary defines “prejudice” as a “[p]reconceived opinion;
bias or leaning favourable or unfavourable; prepossession . . . an
instance of this; a feeling, favourable or unfavourable, towards any
person or thing, prior to or not based on actual experience; bias,
partiality,”18 and Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
elaborates that it is “an opinion or leaning adverse to anything [formed]
without just grounds or before sufficient knowledge.”19
Impartiality, described in these ways, has been a defining feature of
the judicial role dating back to antiquity. Plato recounts that in 399 BC,
Socrates described a judge’s responsibilities in the following way:
“Four things belong to a judge: to hear courteously, to answer wisely, to
consider soberly, and to decide impartially.”20 To better understand how
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 700 (2d ed. 1989).
Id. at 265.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 356–57.
2 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 1788 (16th ed. 1971).
20. FRANKLIN PIERCE ADAMS, BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 466 (1952).
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and why law regulates judicial impartiality, it helps to appreciate the
range of perceived partiality problems to which lawyers, lawmakers,
and judges have responded over time. Such an exercise requires an
exploration beyond legal texts to sources that reflect broader public
concerns. In the absence of polling data from the distant past, partiality
problems as portrayed in literature (fictional and not) may be the next
best proxy, for they illuminate how judicial partiality was understood by
authors of the time—understandings intended to resonate with
contemporary readers. Studying partiality problems of the past with
reference to literature of the day comes with two caveats: first, literature
offers insights into how judicial conduct was perceived, but not
necessarily how judges actually behaved; and second, fiction writers
can be expected to exaggerate perceived problems to make their points
and sell books. Here, however, my objective is limited to categorizing
the range of judicial biases and prejudices that have been on the public’s
mind over time, where it is irrelevant that the nature and extent of such
biases and prejudices have sometimes been exaggerated. Armed with
this deeply rooted typology, it is comparatively easy work to sort and
situate analogous events that implicate judicial partiality in current
debate.
Conceptions of judicial partiality, drawn from depictions in nonlegal
texts, can be organized into four categories: judges who have personal
interests in case outcomes; judges who have relational interests in case
outcomes; judges who have political interests in case outcomes; and
judges who have personal biases for or against case participants that are
unattributable to the judges’ personal, relational, or political interests.
A. The Judge Who Has a Personal Interest in Case Outcomes
The archetype of the partial judge is the corrupt jurist who solicits or
accepts bribes. As early as the second century BC, Shudraka wrote of
the need for judges to be “untouched by avarice.”21 William of
Nassington and John Gower each complained of fourteenth century
English judges siding with whichever party gave the judge the larger
gift,22 and a folktale of that period—widely told across the Eurasian
continent—recounted this phenomenon in humorous terms: A carpenter
and a butcher took each other to court over a will. The carpenter gave
the judge’s wife a wagon and the judge sided with the carpenter until
the butcher presented the judge’s wife with four oxen to pull the wagon,
whereupon the judge entered judgment for the butcher.23 “Turn the
21. Shudraka, The Little Clay Cart, in 9 HARVARD ORIENTAL SERIES 133–34 (Arthur
William Ryder trans., 1905) (2007), available at http://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/lcc.
22. KATHLEEN E. KENNEDY, MAINTENANCE, MEED, AND MARRIAGE IN MEDIEVAL ENGLISH
LITERATURE 92, 96 (2009) (recounting the views of Nassington and Gower).
23. Theo Meder, Tales of Tricks and Greed and Big Surprises: Laymen’s Views of the
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wagon,” called the carpenter to the judge, but the judge replied: “The
wagon cannot be turned, for the oxen want to go the other way.”24 Three
centuries later, concerns persisted. In England, A Poem on the Times
wryly observed:
The ambidextrous judges, bribed, rebrib’d
And lesser gifts to greater still subscribed.25
In an eighteenth century Chinese novel, Celebrated Cases of Judge Dee,
the anonymous author wrote that “the amelioration of the common
people depends on the honesty of the magistrate,” adding that
“magistrates who let their conduct of a case be influenced by
bribes . . . should never be appointed a ruler over others,” because “how
could such men make their subordinates honest, and bring peace to the
common people?”26 While the personal interest at stake for the partial
judge is typically economic, that is not always so. In Shakespeare’s
Measure for Measure, for example, the corrupt quid pro quo featured a
judge who sought to trade a decision for sexual favors.27
Partial judges have also been portrayed as abusing judicial power for
personal gain by means other than the traditional quid pro quo. Geoffrey
Chaucer’s Physician’s Tale concerned a “wicked judge” who paid a
“churl” to falsely claim that a “noble knight’s” daughter was the churl’s
slave so that the judge would have a pretext to take custody of the
knight’s daughter and have his way with her.28 Judges who accepted
gifts from interested parties after the case was over, or without express
or implied assurances of reciprocation, raised the specter of partiality
for personal gain without demonstrable corruption.29 In the absence of
stable and adequate judicial salaries, such gifts were in lieu of income,
and debate persists to this day on the extent to which the rampant
bribery complained of in England throughout the middle part of the
second millennium was real or merely perceived—particularly given the
harsh penalties in place for bribery.30 There is no disputing, however,
that gifts from parties invited favoritism, fueled widespread suspicions
Law in Dutch Oral Narrative, 21 HUMOR 435, 438–39 (2008).
24. Id. at 439.
25. Wilfrid Prest, Judicial Corruption in Early Modern England, 133 PAST & PRESENT 67,
69 (1991) (quoting A Poem on the Times).
26. CELEBRATED CASES OF JUDGE DEE 5–6 (Robert Van Gulik trans., 1976).
27. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 2, sc. 4, lines 52–54.
28. See GEOFFREY CHAUCER, CANTERBURY TALES 283–90 (J.U. Nicolson trans., Garden
City Publ’g Co. ed. 1934).
29. KENNEDY, supra note 22, at 111 (“Receiving payment after an impartial decision was
still considered wrong.”).
30. Prest, supra note 25, at 72–73 (“If for no better reason than fear of the
consequences . . . medieval judges cannot usually have behaved in ways which directly
contravened the letter of their oath . . . .”).
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of corruption, and were—with the exception of modest gifts of food and
drink—regarded as troublesome.31 In 1620, Sir Francis Bacon was
impeached for accepting gifts from litigants, despite his proof that he
often ruled against his benefactors.32 Later that century, Sir Matthew
Hale penned a personal code of judicial conduct that included the selfadmonition “[t]o abhor all private solicitations . . . in matters
depending.”33 The practice of judges subsidizing their incomes by
keeping the fines they assessed—a practice requiring disqualification of
judges in English courts as early as 160934—likewise concerned a
judge’s problematic personal interest in case outcomes outside the
context of corrupt quid pro quos.
Contemporary analogs: The judge who abuses his office for personal
gain by taking bribes or accepting favors continues to exemplify the bad
judge depicted in television series and films. In a new twist on this
ancient problem, John Grisham’s The Appeal portrays an interested
party who bought influence with a justice on the Mississippi Supreme
Court by contributing to his election campaign.35 These stories mirror
contemporaneous events: twice in the past generation, judicial
corruption has held the spotlight on the nation’s biggest stage for
official misconduct—congressional impeachment proceedings. In 1989,
Congress impeached and removed District Judge Alcee Hastings for
conspiring to solicit a bribe.36 And in 2010, Congress impeached and
removed District Judge G. Thomas Porteous for, among other things,
soliciting money from an attorney in a pending case.37 Sting operations
aimed at rooting out judicial corruption at the local level have also made
occasional headlines.38 Issues raised by Grisham’s The Appeal have
played out in West Virginia and elsewhere as reformers have decried
the influence, real or perceived, of campaign contributions on judicial
decision making, and its adverse impact on judicial impartiality.39 In a
31. Id. at 71–73.
32. MARY L. VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT: A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON 70–
71 (1996).
33. LORD CAMPBELL, supra note 13, at 208.
34. See Bonham v. Coll. of Physicians (Dr. Bonham’s Case), 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652
(1610).
35. See generally JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (2008).
36. EMILY FIELD VAN TASSEL & PAUL FINKELMAN, IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY FROM 1787 TO THE PRESENT 172–74 (1999).
37. Details of the Articles of Impeachment for Porteous, CQ WEEKLY (Dec. 13, 2010),
available at http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/document.php?id=weeklyreport111-00000377
7898&type=toc&num=77&.
38. See, e.g., JAMES TUOHY & ROB WARDEN, GREYLORD: JUSTICE, CHICAGO STYLE 36–57
(1989) (describing the “Greylord” sting operation); Drew Broach, Judges Probe Began with 1
Tip: Bondsman Pointed Finger at Rival, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Oct. 31, 2011, at
A1 (describing the “Wrinkled Robe” sting operation).
39. See JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000–2009:
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like vein, lawmakers and the media have criticized judges for taking
expense paid “junkets” to educational seminars at vacation resorts,
courtesy of corporations with an interest in cases coming before those
judges, arguing that such trips create an appearance—if not the reality—
of partiality.40
B. The Judge Who Has a Relational Interest in Case Outcomes
The concern that impartiality could be corrupted by a judge’s
preexisting relationship with parties to a proceeding is longstanding. As
early as the second century BC, Shudraka urged judges to show “equal
grace” to “friend, foe, [and] kinsman.”41 The peril of judges being
influenced by their friendships was a topic of concern in fourteenth
century Europe. John Gower, writing in the 1370s, noted how difficult it
was to bring suit against anyone who had ties to the judge, and
criticized the practice of litigants finding nobles who were friendly with
the judge to write letters vouching for litigants in court.42
Authors have likewise chronicled the danger of partial judges
presiding over trials of their enemies. In the fifteenth century, Thomas
Hoclave recounted the story of a Persian judge who the king ordered to
be flayed alive for sentencing a personal enemy to death.43 And in his
quasi-historical work Personal Recollections of Joan of Arc, Mark
Twain wrote of Bishop Cauchon—who presided at Joan’s trial for
heresy notwithstanding his vested interest in her demise—that “this
proposed judge was the prisoner’s outspoken enemy, and therefore he
was incompetent to try her.”44
Then, there are relatives. In Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland, the King was doubly encumbered: he was a judge
presiding over a trial in which his tyrannical wife was the victim of an
alleged tart theft, and he was a nincompoop.45 The resulting partiality
problem manifested itself as a race to judgment. No sooner was the
indictment read against the Knave of Hearts than the King-Judge, with
the Queen scowling at his side, directed the jury to “[c]onsider your
verdict,” prompting the herald (the white rabbit) to admonish the King:
DECADE OF CHANGE 1–4 (2010). Campaign contributors can likewise create an external political
interest in case outcomes for the judge. See infra Section I.C.; Meryl J. Chertoff, Trends in
Judicial Selection in the States, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 47, 48 (2010).
40. See, e.g., Glen Elsasser, Activists Shine Light On Junkets For Judges, CHI. TRIB., July
25, 2000, at N4; Editorial, Time to Ban Judicial Junkets, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2005, at A18.
41. Shudraka, supra note 21.
42. KENNEDY, supra note 22, at 96.
43. Id. at 111.
44. 2 MARK TWAIN, PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF JOAN OF ARC 64–65 (1896).
45. See LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE
LOOKING-GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 91–103 (Orion Publ’g Grp. 1993) (1865).
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“Not yet, not yet! . . . There’s a great deal to come before that!”46 As the
proceedings continued, the King passively abided the Queen’s mid-trial
exhortations to declare the knave guilty and have him beheaded, before
calling upon the jury to render a verdict “for about the twentieth time
that day,” only to have the enraged Queen rejoin: “No, no! . . . Sentence
first—verdict afterwards.”47
Contemporary analogs: The risk of favoritism that relational
conflicts of interest create is embodied in the contemporary adage: “A
good lawyer knows the law; a great lawyer knows the judge.” In 2004,
Justice Antonin Scalia provoked a media firestorm when he refused to
withdraw from a case in which Vice President Dick Cheney was a party,
after flying to Louisiana at the Vice President’s invitation for a weekend
of duck hunting while the case was pending.48 In 2008, Wisconsin
Supreme Court Justice Annette Ziegler was reprimanded for presiding
over cases, as a court of appeals judge, in which her husband’s business
was a party.49 More recently still, Justice Clarence Thomas’s
qualifications to sit in a case concerning the constitutionality of health
care reform legislation has been challenged on the grounds that
organizations with which his wife was affiliated stood to gain if the
legislation was invalidated.50
C. The Judge Who Has a Political Interest in Case Outcomes
Impartiality has often been portrayed as compromised when judges
have a political interest in the outcome of a proceeding. Political
interests can be subdivided into the external and internal. External
political interests are situated at the intersection between judicial
impartiality and judicial independence: a judge’s impartiality is
undermined when her political future is subject to manipulation or
control by others who have an interest in the outcomes of cases the
judge decides. Internal political interests, in contrast, relate to
ideological zeal, which can bias the judge for or against litigants and
lead her to prejudge cases.

46. Id. at 93.
47. Id. at 101.
48. See Editorial, The Court’s Honor at Stake, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Mar. 19,
2004, at 20; Op-Ed., Duck Blinded: Scalia’s Trip Doesn’t Pass Smell Test, OKLAHOMAN, Feb.
19, 2004, at 12A; Editorial, Justice in a Bind, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2004, at A12; Editorial,
Position Looks Compromising, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Feb. 3, 2004, at 16A;
Editorial, Scalia’s Conflict of Interest, DENVER POST, Jan. 26, 2004, at B-07; Op-Ed., Scalia
Tries to Duck Conflict with Waterfowl Reasoning, TAMPA TRIB. (Fla.), Jan. 26, 2004, at 18.
49. Steven Elbow, State Supreme Court Reprimands Ziegler in Unprecedented Ruling,
CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), May 28, 2008.
50. Robert Barnes, As Health Case Looms, 2 Justices Targeted: Conservatives Attack
Kagan While Liberals Slash at Thomas, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 4, 2011, at A23.
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Illustrations abound of judges whose impartiality has been depicted
as compromised by external political interests. The most infamous
example comes from the crucifixion scene in the New Testament:
Pontius Pilate judged Jesus blameless, but acquiesced to calls for his
crucifixion after the Jews cried out, saying “[i]f you let this man go, you
are no friend of Caesar.”51 In Leo Tolstoy’s Resurrection, a panel of
judges imposed a harsh sentence on the accused—notwithstanding its
recognition that the jury had convicted her inadvertently by bungling
the verdict forms—because the judges feared adverse publicity if they
were perceived as lenient.52 Conversely, in A Child’s History of
England, Charles Dickens idealized an impartial judge through the lens
of a “doubtful” story in which a “brave and generous,” though “wild
and dissipated,” prince drew a sword on the chief justice “because [the
judge] was firm in dealing impartially with one of [the prince’s]
dissolute companions.”53 The justice had the prince arrested, and the
prince acquiesced, which offered King Henry, and Dickens, a teaching
moment: “Happy is the monarch who has so just a judge, and a son so
willing to obey the laws.”54
Emblematic of the jurist whose internal political interests
compromise his impartiality is the iconic “hanging judge.” Robert Louis
Stevenson’s description of Lord Hermiston, in The Weir of Hermiston,
is illustrative: “[H]e did not affect the virtue of impartiality; this was no
case for refinement; there was a man to be hanged, he would have said,
and he was hanging him. Nor was it possible to see his lordship, and
acquit him of gusto in the task.”55 The hanging judge’s impartiality is
thus undermined by his ideological predisposition to convict and
execute, reflected in his indifference to the rule of law. A vivid, if
disturbing, illustration comes from the story files of Judge Roy Bean:
“Carlos Robles, this court finds you charged with a
grave offense against the peace and dignity of the sovereign
State of Texas, to wit: cattle rustlin’. How do you plead?”
Unable to understand a word of English the defendant
uttered a few sentences in Spanish.
“Court accepts yore [sic] plea of guilty. The jury will
now deliberate, and if'n it brings in a verdict short of
hangin’ it’ll be declared in contempt. Gentlemen, what’s
yore [sic] verdict?”
51. John 19:12 (New International Version).
52. LEO TOLSTOY, RESURRECTION 95–97 (Anthony Briggs ed. & trans., Penguin Classics
2009) (1899).
53. 1 CHARLES DICKENS, A CHILD’S HISTORY OF ENGLAND 268 (1853).
54. Id.
55. ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON, WEIR OF HERMISTON 46 (Charles Scribner’s Sons 1907)
(1896).
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“Guilty as hell, your honor.”56
Contemporary analogs: If the hanging judge was emblematic of the
nineteenth century jurist whose internal ideological predilections
compromised his impartiality, the twenty-first century analog is the
“activist judge.” The activist judge, whose constitutional and statutory
analyses are polluted by her ideological biases, is not typically the stuff
of riveting legal thrillers, but has achieved a prominent place in
American political theater. At the turn of the twenty-first century,
conservative court critics decried liberal activists—primarily in the
federal district and circuit courts—who allegedly disregarded the law
and substituted their political preferences. More recently, critics on the
political left have responded in kind, by accusing the Supreme Court of
conservative judicial activism.57 To address the problem of “activist”
judges who compromise their impartiality by acting upon their internal
political interests, court critics have, with mixed success, undertaken to
impeach wayward judges, cut their budgets, curtail their jurisdiction,
solicit their views (if not their commitments) on issues they are likely to
decide as judges, and subject them to other means of political
accountability.58 Court defenders, in turn, have characterized such
efforts as aimed at manipulating judges into making decisions that the
critics favor; put another way, court critics stand accused of seeking to
control judges by exerting external political influence on the judges
targeted, to the detriment of judicial independence and impartiality.59 In
an age when “[w]e are all legal realists now,”60 it is perhaps
unsurprising that the public would thus perceive political influences as
posing two distinct threats to judges’ impartiality: internally, from
judges who skew their rulings to implement their own political agendas,
and externally, from outsiders who seek to implement their political
agendas by conforming judges to their will.
D. The Judge Who Has a Personal Bias
Bias is useful in this typology primarily as a residual category—a
bin for forms of partiality that cannot otherwise be categorized as a
judge’s personal, relational, or political interest in the outcome of a
proceeding.61 A prominent subset of cases left for the “bias” category is
56. RICHARD ERDOES, SALOONS OF THE OLD WEST 138 (1979).
57. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Criticism and Speech of Judges in the United States,
in JUDICIARIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 257, 263–66 (H.P. Lee ed., 2011) (documenting
attacks on judges).
58. See id.
59. See generally Charles G. Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 191 (2012) [hereinafter Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive?].
60. Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988).
61. Bias attributable to the judge’s prior relationship with an individual (rather than with
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status- or group-based prejudice: unjustifiable fondness for or antipathy
toward parties or other participants in the process because of their status
as members of a particular race, ethnicity, class, gender, or other
identifiable group.
The forms of status- or group-based judicial bias with the most
distinguished pedigree are wealth and class. At its basest level, judicial
bias in favor of the wealthy and against the poor has one foot in corrupt
judicial self-interest, discussed earlier: when judges award decisions to
the highest bidder, rich parties win and poor parties lose. But the
problem, as depicted over time, has transcended corruption. One scholar
has described the work of medieval poets who decried “class justice,” in
which “a poor man can hardly ever win against a rich man or a
nobleman, no matter how just his case may be.”62 To counter the
perceived problem, English judges took an oath as early as the
fourteenth century “to do equal law and execution of right to all . . . rich
or poor,”63 and in the seventeenth century, Sir Matthew Hale’s code of
judicial conduct addressed this ongoing concern with the rule “[t]hat I
be not biassed with compassion to the poor, or favor to the rich.”64
In Amelia, published in 1751, Henry Fielding described a day in the
court of Justice Thrasher, who: convicted a “poor woman,” falsely
accused of streetwalking, after rejecting her truthful defense; dismissed
charges against a “genteel young man and woman,” after “declar[ing]
with much warmth that the fact [recounted in the charge against them]
was incredible and impossible”; and convicted a “shabbily dressed”
man, rejecting his truthful claim that the crime had been perpetrated by
two others “who appeared to be men of fortune.”65 While Fielding noted
that some of these proceedings were tainted by bribery, his final,
sarcastic indictment of Thrasher went not to his corruption but to his
bias against the poor: “In short, the magistrate had too great an honour
for truth to suspect that she ever appeared in sordid apparel; nor did he
ever sully his sublime notions of that virtue by uniting them with the
mean ideas of poverty and distress.”66
In William Godwin’s Things as They Are; or, The Adventures of
Caleb Williams, published in 1794, the protagonist was a secretary,
whose employer was a wealthy man who committed murder and framed
the secretary for robbery.67 When the secretary defended himself by
the group to which the individual belongs), for example, is a form of relational interest; bias
attributable to the issues a party raises is a form of political interest.
62. Meder, supra note 23, at 438.
63. Prest, supra note 25, at 71.
64. Quoted in LORD CAMPBELL, supra note 13, at 208.
65. 1 HENRY FIELDING, AMELIA 8–9 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1962) (1751).
66. Id. at 10.
67. See WILLIAM GODWIN, THINGS AS THEY ARE; OR, THE ADVENTURES OF CALEB
WILLIAMS (David McCracken, ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1982) (1794).
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reporting the truth, the judge summarily rebuffed him:
A fine time of it indeed it would be, if, when gentlemen of
six thousand a year take up their servants for robbing them,
those servants could trump up such accusations as these,
and could get any magistrate or court of justice to listen to
them! . . . There would be a speedy end to all order and
good government, if fellows that trample upon ranks and
distinctions in this atrocious sort, were upon any
consideration suffered to get off.68
Ethnic, racial, and gender bias have likewise been featured in
depictions of judicial conduct. In Amelia, Justice Thrasher found a
defendant guilty, explaining: “Sirrah, your tongue betrays your guilt.
You are an Irishman, and that is always sufficient evidence with me.”69
In the 1898 nonfictional polemic J’Accuse!, Emile Zola attacked the
French administration of justice for its court martial of Captain Alfred
Dreyfus, which Zola attributed to a “‘dirty Jew’ obsession that is the
scourge of our time.”70 In perhaps his most infamous tale, Judge Roy
Bean purportedly acquitted a defendant of murder, reasoning that “I find
the law very explicit on murdering your fellow man, but there’s nothing
here about killing a Chinaman. Case dismissed”—an episode famous
for its grotesque racial bias, but complicated by an overlay of political
partiality: Bean was surrounded by an angry group of the perpetrator’s
friends, who were intent on violence if their comrade was convicted.71
And in the climactic trial scene of Mary Wollstonecraft’s eighteenth
century novel The Wrongs of Woman, a misogynist judge trivialized the
protagonist’s suffering at the hands of an abusive husband in a marriage
she could not escape.72 “What virtuous woman thought of her
feelings?,” he asked rhetorically, answering that “[i]t was her duty to
love and obey the man chosen by her parents and relations, who were
qualified by their experience to judge better for her, than she could for
herself.”73
What message do these depictions of judicial bias convey?
Sometimes, as with Judge Roy Bean, they may be nothing more than
stories about a judge with a bias—the isolated bad (if colorful) apple,
68. Id. at 276.
69. FIELDING, supra note 65, at 8.
70. Emile Zola, J’Accuse!, L’AURORE (Paris, Fr.), Jan. 13, 1898, available at
http://www.oxygenee.com/Zola-and-Dreyfus.pdf.
71. Shawn E. Tuma, Law in Texas Literature: Texas Justice—Judge Roy Bean Style, 21
REV. LITIG. 551, 561 (2002).
72. See MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, THE WRONGS OF WOMAN 129–34 (W.W. Norton & Co.
ed., 1994) (1798).
73. Id. at 133.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2014

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 4

508

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

whose misconduct is meant to say nothing about judges generally. At
other times, however, the biased judge is portrayed as a representative
sample from a bad barrel. Of Justice Thrasher, Fielding remarked that
“[t]he higher we proceed among our public officers and magistrates, the
less defects of this kind will, perhaps, be observable”74—which by
negative implication meant that Thrasher’s defects were widely
observable among “lower” magistrates. Godwin’s magistrate was the
foil for an even more sweeping indictment: “And this at last was the
justice of mankind!,” Caleb Williams railed, despairing that “six
thousand a year shall protect a man from accusation; and the validity of
an impeachment shall be superseded, because the author of it is a
servant!”75 Similarly, Wollstonecraft’s judge was written into the
climax of The Wrongs of Woman as emblematic of his gender and of the
bias of men toward women.
These categorical claims of judicial partiality imply a more
intractable problem: impartiality is illusory. Judges are elites captured
by their own biases, who will protect the interests of fellow elites at the
expense of the general public. The sentiment is succinctly expressed in
the African proverb: “Corn can’t expect justice from a court composed
of chickens.”76 In Spoon River Anthology, published in 1916, Edgar Lee
Masters made a similar, if narrower, point in an anecdote about a
diminutive judge for whom “it was natural” to “ma[k]e it hard” on “the
giants” who appeared before him, given the teasing the judge had
endured earlier in life.77 Lighthearted though this story may be, it is but
a short walk from there to the darker conclusion that judges are
ensnared by the same prejudices that afflict us all—prejudices
attributable to the influences of their class, gender, race, ethnicity, and
life experiences. Some nineteenth century thinkers made that very point.
Robert Green Ingersoll declared that “[w]e must remember that we have
to make judges out of men, and that by being made judges their
prejudices are not diminished and their intelligence is not increased.”78
David Dudley Field echoed, “Judges are but men, and are swayed like
other men by vehement prejudices. This is corruption in reality, give it
whatever other name you please.”79
Contemporary analogs: The civil rights movement of the 1950s and
1960s has been retold in books and films that feature racist state judges
74. FIELDING, supra note 65, at 6.
75. GODWIN, supra note 67, at 277.
76. MADISON MCGRAW, JUSTIFY THE MEANS 128 (2003).
77. Edgar Lee Masters, Judge Selah Lively, in SPOON RIVER ANTHOLOGY 94 (Bartleby
1999) (1916), available at http://www.bartleby.com/84/94.html.
78. Robert G. Ingersoll, Speech in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 22, 1883).
79. David Dudley Field, A Few Words on Judicial Integrity, 6 ALBANY L.J. 265, 265
(1872).
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of the Jim Crow era and their heroic federal counterparts who weathered
local animus and implemented new civil rights laws.80 In the 1980s and
1990s, court systems undertook racial and gender bias studies that
documented problems including, but not limited to, judges.81 The
critical legal studies movement of the 1980s revisited the ancient
problem of class bias in systemic terms, arguing that rules of law were
written, enforced, and upheld by elites, including judges, who protect
entrenched interests of the powerful at the expense of the powerless.82
Critical race and feminist theories arose out of the critical legal studies
movement and explored similar themes in the context of race, gender,
ethnicity, and sexual orientation.83 Even more recently, minority judges
have found themselves in the crosshairs of high-profile claims that their
impartiality is compromised by bias: can a gay judge in a stable
relationship fairly adjudicate the constitutionality of a law banning
same-sex marriage?84 Is it problematic for a Latina judge to say that she
will analyze cases differently than her white, male counterparts?85
II. THE DIMENSIONS OF IMPARTIALITY
Writers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had already come
to the unremarkable conclusion that judges were human beings, and as
such were subject to human prejudices.86 Social science research has
since documented that judges, particularly Justices on the U.S. Supreme
Court, are influenced by their ideological predilections.87 Some political
80. As to books, see, for example, JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES: A VIVID ACCOUNT OF
BROWN DECISION IN THE SOUTH BY SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES
COMMITTED TO THE RULE OF LAW (1981). As to films, see, for example, MISSISSIPPI BURNING
(Orion Pictures 1988) (depicting FBI agents investigating the murder of civil rights workers).
81. See generally Blake D. Morant, Introductory Essay: The Relevance of Gender Bias
Studies, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1073 (2001) (discussing racial and gender bias studies); Myra
C. Selby, Examining Race and Gender Bias in the Courts: A Legacy of Indifference or
Opportunity?, 32 IND. L. REV. 1167 (1999).
82. Allan C. Hutchinson, Introduction to CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 1, 4 (Allan C.
Hutchinson ed., 1989).
83. See, e.g., Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, in CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES, supra note 82, at 120–36; Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and
the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, in CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 82, at 56–
76.
84. See Leff, supra note 5.
85. Julie Hirschfield Davis, Sotomayor Is Confirmed in Historic Vote by Senate,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W. Va.), Aug. 7, 2009, at A1 (noting that opponents of Justice
Sotomayor during her nomination process repeatedly cited a speech in which “she hoped a ‘wise
Latina’ judge would usually make better decisions than a white man”).
86. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
87. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL xvi (1993) (“[W]e demonstrate that . . . the facts of the case and the ideology of the
justices . . . successfully explain and predict the votes of Supreme Court justices.”).
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
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scientists have discussed the ways in which judges strategically
implement their policy preferences,88 while others have argued that the
choices judges make are influenced by the audiences whose approval
they seek.89 Studies of heuristics have shown that judges, like the
general population, are apt to take mental shortcuts in their decision
making by acting upon a range of subconscious biases.90 More recent
research has documented the impact of judges’ race and gender on their
decision making in discrimination cases.91 In short, perfect judicial
impartiality does not exist.
If perfect judicial impartiality is the elusive ideal, the more
pragmatic quest is for “impartial enough.” That begs the question,
“impartial enough for what?” The answer turns logically on the goal
judicial impartiality seeks to achieve, a goal that judges and lawyers
everywhere would identify, almost reflexively, as “the rule of law.”
Insofar as we remove partiality from the decision making equation,
what is left are the merits of the dispute before the judge—merits to be
decided on the basis of applicable facts and law. And so, efforts to
define the role of the judge in government typically emphasize the need
for impartial judges to promote the rule of law.92
In a world where imperfect impartiality is a constant, however,
saying that impartial judges are needed to uphold the law merely skirts
the question of how much partiality can be tolerated before rule of law
objectives are thwarted to an unacceptable degree. Such an inquiry is
further complicated by the realization that the law itself often is what it
is because judges previously said that it was—judges who were
influenced to an uncertain degree by their ideological and other
88. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUDGES MAKE xiii (1998).
89. LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR 4 (2006) (“I argue that judges care about the regard of salient audiences because they
like that regard in itself, not just as a means to other ends. Further . . . judges’ interest in what
their audiences think of them has fundamental effects on their behavior as decision makers.”).
90. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3–6, 15, 17–18, 27 (2007); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 779–84 (2001); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of
Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 571–75 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics
and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 61, 64–65 (2000).
91. See, e.g., Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An
Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117 (2009); Jennifer L.
Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal
Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759 (2005).
92. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Pmbl. (2007) [hereinafter MODEL CODE] (“The
United States legal system is based upon the principle that an independent, impartial, and
competent judiciary . . . will interpret and apply the law that governs our society.”); A.B.A,
JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE 21ST
CENTURY JUDICIARY 9 (2003) (“[Judges] must, in short, be impartial if we are to be governed by
the rule of law rather than judicial whim.”).
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prejudices. A better understanding of how impartial a judge must be to
uphold the rule of law requires an appreciation for who the beneficiaries
of an impartial judiciary are. Put another way, whether a judge is
“impartial enough” to uphold the law may depend on who we are trying
to convince, why they care, and what is needed to convince them. As
elaborated upon below, judicial impartiality serves three distinct
audiences, giving rise to three distinct dimensions of impartiality: (1)
parties and the procedural dimension, (2) the public and the political
dimension, and (3) judges and the ethical dimension.
Parties: At an elemental level, judges resolve disputes for the benefit
of parties to those disputes. The stories of corrupt, conflicted, or biased
judges, recounted in Part I, often cast losing parties as the ultimate
victims—the martyrdom of Jesus Christ and Joan of Arc at the hands of
partial judges being extreme examples. In the heat of battle, disputants
may regard an impartial judge as their second choice; it would be best to
have a partial judge who will rule in their favor. An impartial judge,
however, remains preferable to a partial one who will rule against them,
and if neither disputant controls the judge, an impartial judge is the
safest alternative. Psychologist Tom Tyler has found that parties are
more apt to accept adverse outcomes in litigation if they feel that they
were subject to a fair process featuring a judge they regarded as
impartial.93 For parties, then, the interest in judicial impartiality is
personal to them, acutely felt, case-specific, and shaped by firsthand
experience. The focus of their attention is on the process employed to
litigate their cases, and whether that process protected them adequately
from the perils of partiality summarized in Part I. This, then, is the
procedural dimension of impartiality.
Public: Judges may adjudicate disputes between private parties, but
they are more than private dispute resolution specialists. They are public
officials who together comprise a separate and independent branch of
government, whose constitutional role is to serve as impartial guardians
of the law. As such, their institutional legitimacy logically depends on
the continuing support of the public that judges serve, which in turn
depends on whether the public regards its judges as fulfilling their
constitutional roles. If the decisions judges make lead the public to
worry that judges are partial in ways that undermine their commitment
to the rule of law, as the public defines it, the judiciary’s institutional
legitimacy may suffer. Thus, in the Celebrated Cases of Judge Dee,
discussed in Part I, the public is portrayed as the ultimate beneficiary of
an impartial judiciary, because partial judges cannot “bring peace to the
93. See TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 83 (1997); Tom R.
Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants’ Evaluations of Their Courtroom
Experience, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51, 69–70 (1984).
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common people.”94 Relative to the parties, then, the public’s interest in
an impartial judiciary is less personal than philosophical or ideological,
more diffuse than acute, systemic rather than case-specific (although
highly publicized cases can breed systemic concerns), and shaped less
by firsthand experience than by impressions gleaned from public
discussions on the acceptability of judges to the body politic. In other
words, the focus of the public’s attention is on the impartiality of judges
in relation to the role they play in the administration of government,
which is “political” in the original sense of the term. This is the political
dimension of impartiality.
The Judge: For over two thousand years, being a good judge has
meant being an impartial judge.95 Impartiality is a defining feature of
the judicial role in ways it is not for other public officials: whereas
legislators, city council members, mayors, governors, and presidents
should be partial to their constituents’ preferences, judges should not. In
the context of its procedural and political dimensions, impartiality is an
instrumental value that serves other ends; being a “good judge” who
impartially upholds the law is important to ensure a fair process to
parties and to promote public confidence in the courts. There remains,
however, an extent to which being “good” is an irreducible end in
itself96: the corrupt or biased judge is simply “wicked,” to borrow
Chaucer’s adjective from The Physician’s Tale.97 To the extent that
being good is its own reward, judges themselves are the beneficiaries of
their own impartiality. As adjudicators at the center of the litigation
process, judges have an interest in the procedural dimension of
impartiality; as representatives of the third branch of government,
judges desire institutional legitimacy and consequently have an interest
in the political dimension of impartiality, too. But as women and men
whose self-identity as good judges is tethered to the oath they have
sworn to be impartial—an oath judges have taken for centuries—there
is a third dimension of impartiality: an ethical dimension.
Thinking about impartiality in terms of its three dimensions yields a
critically important insight: different dimensions may yield different
answers to the question, how impartial is impartial enough? Depending
on the context, the impartiality needed to provide parties with a fair
hearing in the procedural dimension may be different than that needed
94. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
96. Judicial independence is often characterized as an instrumental value that furthers
other ends, such as the rule of law, and not as an end in itself. Impartiality, however, is different.
Judicial independence qua freedom from external control is a privilege subject to abuse, while
impartiality, as an unbiased, unprejudiced state of mind, is not. Therefore, in relation to the
judicial role, independence cannot be characterized as an unqualified good in the way that
impartiality can.
97. See CHAUCER, supra note 28.
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to reassure the public in the political dimension, which may, in turn,
differ from the impartiality required to ensure that judges are behaving
honorably in the ethical dimension. To better understand the different
ways in which the partiality problems identified in Part I are evaluated
depending upon the dimension of impartiality at issue, it is helpful to
look at the ways in which judicial impartiality is regulated.
III. REGULATING THE DIMENSIONS OF IMPARTIALITY
The procedural, ethical, and political dimensions of judicial
impartiality have been regulated in different but overlapping ways. The
distinct means by which regulatory schemes manage judicial
impartiality can, for the most part, be explained with reference to the
varying goals of promoting judicial impartiality in the three dimensions:
to ensure procedural fairness for parties in the litigation process; to
encourage judges to conduct themselves honorably and ethically; and to
preserve public confidence in the courts. A full appreciation of these
regulatory mechanisms, however, also requires that they be understood
against the backdrop of historical, pragmatic, and other constraints that
have affected their development.
I elaborate here on the primary mechanisms that regulate impartiality
in each dimension: due process, disqualification, and rules of litigation
procedure in the procedural dimension; codes of judicial conduct and
disciplinary processes in the ethical dimension; and removal, selection,
and oversight in the political dimension. In so doing, I do not mean to
imply that the compartmentalization of judicial impartiality is tidy.98
Mechanisms that I have assigned to one dimension can serve the
interests of another. For example, disqualification rules that parties
exploit to protect their rights to an impartial judge in the procedural
dimension also serve as standards of good judicial conduct in the ethical
dimension.99 Codes of judicial conduct, while centered in the ethical
dimension, include rules oriented toward ensuring a fair process for
parties100 and promoting public confidence in the courts,101 which
98. Professor Stephen Burbank has expressed a preference for “the messiness of lived
experience to the tidiness of unrealistically parsimonious models.” Stephen B. Burbank, On the
Study of Judicial Behaviors: Of Law, Politics, Science, and Humility, in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO
DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE 41, 53 (Charles
Gardner Geyh ed., 2011). While Professor Burbank was writing about quantitative models, his
point applies equally to theory. There is a line between simplification and oversimplification
that scholars must not cross.
99. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006), with U.S. COURTS, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED
STATES JUDGES Canon 3C (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/us
courts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Vol02A-Ch02.pdf.
100. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 92, R. 2.2 & cmt. 1 (requiring judges to “perform
all duties of judicial office . . . impartially,” to “ensure impartiality and fairness to all parties”);
id. R. 2.6 & cmt. 1 (requiring that judges guarantee all parties “the right to be heard according to
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overlap with the procedural and political dimensions, respectively.
Impeachment, while a remedy for judges whose partiality violates the
public trust in the political dimension, also delineates standards of
judicial conduct that inform the ethical dimension.102 Notwithstanding
such messiness at the margins, thinking about judicial impartiality in
relation to the dimensions it occupies is worth the trouble because it
elucidates the complexities and seeming contradictions that pervade the
subject and gave rise to the imponderables that introduced this Article.
A. Regulating Impartiality in the Procedural Dimension
There are three basic procedural mechanisms that are brought to bear
to preserve impartiality for the benefit of parties to litigation: (1) the
Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions, (2)
disqualification processes, and (3) rules of litigation procedure.
Understanding the scope and limits of these mechanisms requires an
appreciation for the relationship between their ends and means, and the
constraints under which they operate.
All three mechanisms in the procedural dimension are implemented
by judges, as part of a larger mission to administer justice on a case-bycase basis. As a consequence, the pursuit of impartiality is necessarily
tempered by the constraints of broader systemic goals. Achieving nearperfect impartiality among judges assigned to hear cases through the
application of overly rigorous processes that compound costs,
exacerbate delays, and compromise the supply of available judges
would purge partiality at the expense of thwarting access to justice, and
thus rob Peter to pay Paul. Hence, the three procedural mechanisms that
promote judicial impartiality must be construed, applied, and ultimately
limited in light of the systemic objective of ensuring the effective and
expeditious administration of justice. Thus, the process that is “due”
parties under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is constrained by an
assessment of the burdens that additional process would impose.103
Ethics rules forbid recusal except when disqualification is required
because “[j]udges must be available to decide the matters that come
before the court,”104 while the “rule of necessity” directs otherwise
law,” which is “an essential component of a[n] . . . impartial system of justice”).
101. See, e.g., id. R. 1.2 (“A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the . . . impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety.”).
102. See infra notes 204–209 and accompanying text (discussing impeachment as a remedy
for less than “good” behavior).
103. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (“[T]he specific dictates of due
process generally requires consideration of . . . the Government’s interest, including . . . the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.”).
104. MODEL CODE, supra note 92, R. 2.7, cmt. 1.
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disqualified judges to hear cases when no other judge would be
qualified to sit.105 The first rule in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
emphasizes that the rules seek not only “just” determinations, but
“speedy[] and inexpensive” ones as well.106
At a minimum, these systemic constraints render the procedural
dimension ill-suited to address the sweeping claims of partiality
described in Part I—that judges are activists whose ideological
predilections create political conflicts of interest that undermine their
impartiality, or that judges are unacceptably biased because of their
class, race, gender, or other status. And so, attempts to remove judges
from cases in litigation on the basis of such categorical claims have
fallen on deaf ears.107 As elaborated upon next, the three mechanisms in
the procedural dimension are best suited to ameliorate judicial partiality
in more limited, narrowly targeted, case-specific ways.
1. The Due Process Clauses
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution
prohibit the national and state governments from depriving persons of
their life, liberty, or property without due process of law.108 In addition,
many state constitutions have a due process clause of their own.109 In
popular culture, an impartial adjudicator has been a defining feature of a
fair judicial process for more than two thousand years.110 It is thus
unsurprising that the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Due
Process Clause in a manner consistent with that ancient understanding
by declaring that “[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of
due process,”111 and that the Due Process Clause guarantees parties the
“right to have an impartial judge.”112
The Due Process Clauses articulate broad principles, but are of only
modest importance in the daily regulation of judicial impartiality in the
procedural dimension. The circumstances in which the Court has
actually held that the “right to have an impartial judge” was violated are
few and limited. The Court has reversed judgments where a state judge
has: kept the fines he assessed against parties that appeared before
105. See CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN
ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAW 13–15 (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter GEYH, DISQUALIFICATION],
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/judicialdq.pdf/$file/judicialdq.pdf.
106. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
107. See FLAMM, supra note 9, § 10.3.
108. See U.S. CONST. amend V; id. amend XIV.
109. See Anthony B. Sanders, The “New Judicial Federalism” Before its Time: A
Comprehensive Review of Economic Substantive Due Process Under State Constitutional Law
Since 1940 and the Reasons for its Recent Decline, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 467 (2005).
110. See supra Part I.
111. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
112. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2014

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 4

516

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

him;113 ruled on the merits of issues that he himself was litigating as a
private party in an unrelated proceeding;114 presided over criminal
contempt proceedings in which the defendants’ allegedly contemptuous
conduct had been directed toward the judge;115 and heard a case in
which a party’s recent support for the judge’s election campaign was so
substantial as to create a probability of bias.116 Such limited application
is attributable to historical, pragmatic, and prudential constraints.
Historically, civil and common law systems each afforded parties
ample opportunity to challenge the impartiality of their respective factfinders—judges under civil law and jurors under common law.117
English common law judges, however, were entitled to an almost
ironclad presumption of impartiality, subject to a lone exception for
cases in which they had an economic interest in the outcome.118 Two
and a half centuries later, the four dissenting Justices in Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co. pointed to this ancient presumption in support of
their argument that a probability of judicial bias does not violate due
process,119 a point the majority deflected by emphasizing how
exceptional and extreme the facts of Caperton were.120 In other words,
the ancient presumption of impartiality limits the application of the Due
Process Clause to deeply rooted exceptions and truly outrageous
circumstances.
Pragmatically, some forms of partiality are more manageable to
regulate than others. For example, personal conflicts of interest—the
first form of partiality that the Supreme Court recognized as implicating
due process concerns121—can be delineated by clear(ish) rules triggered
whenever a conflict arises. Divining judicial bias, in contrast, requires
an assessment of the judge’s subjective state of mind—a difficult task
that courts have long been reluctant to undertake.122 In Caperton, the
113. See, e.g., id. at 523.
114. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 823–24 (1986).
115. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 503 (1974); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400
U.S. 455, 466 (1971); Murchison, 349 U.S. at 139.
116. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2264–65, 2267 (2009).
117. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again., 30 REV.
LITIG. 671, 677–78 (2011).
118. John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 611–12 (1947).
119. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“There is a ‘presumption of
honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators’ . . . . All judges take an oath to uphold the
Constitution and apply the law impartially, and we trust that they will live up to this promise.”).
120. Id. at 2263, 2265 (majority opinion) (noting that “this is an exceptional case” and
“[t]he facts now before us are extreme by any measure”).
121. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
122. See Inhabitants of Northampton v. Smith, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 390, 396 (1846) (“[A]n
interest in a question or subject matter, arising from feeling and sympathy, may be more
efficacious in influencing the judgment, than even a pecuniary interest; but an interest of such a
character would be too vague to serve as a test . . . .”); Frank, supra note 118, at 611–12
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majority sought to make such assessments more manageable by crafting
an objective “probability” of bias standard for assessing due process
claims.123 Chief Justice John Roberts, writing on behalf of the four
dissenters, was unconvinced and itemized forty questions that the new
standard left unanswered, leading him to the conclusion that regulating
probable bias was unworkable.124 The majority’s rejoinder was to
emphasize, repeatedly, how rarely its probable bias standard would be
triggered.125
Prudentially, the Due Process Clause is a backstop, or last resort,
constrained by respect for separation of powers and federalism
concerns, that “demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial
disqualifications.”126 While the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
presumably guarantees litigants the right to an impartial judge in federal
court, federal courts have long avoided constitutional questions when
cases can be resolved on nonconstitutional grounds.127 Given the
availability of disqualification under federal statute,128 then, recourse to
the Fifth Amendment is unnecessary. The need for state courts to
ameliorate judicial partiality through resort to the Fourteenth
Amendment or the due process clauses of their own constitutions is
similarly obviated by the availability of state disqualification rules.129
Although the Fourteenth Amendment affords federal courts the
opportunity to address the qualifications of state judges, principles of
comity and federalism have restricted the reach of Fourteenth
Amendment claims. In Tumey v. Ohio,130 for example, the Court ruled
that the Due Process Clause forbade a judge from presiding over a case
in which he had a financial conflict of interest, but not before opining
that “[a]ll questions of judicial qualification may not involve
constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal bias, state
policy, remoteness of interest would seem generally to be matters
(“English common law practice at the time of the establishment of the American court system
was simple in the extreme. Judges disqualified for financial interest. No other disqualifications
were permitted, and bias . . . was rejected entirely.”).
123. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265.
124. Id. at 2267, 2269–72 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
125. See id. at 2265–67 (majority opinion).
126. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986).
127. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of.”).
128. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006).
129. State courts, like their federal counterparts, adhere to Ashwander avoidance principles.
See, e.g., Jack Tuholske, Going With the Flow: The Montana Court’s Conservative Approach to
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 MONT. L. REV. 237, 242–43 (2011) (noting that the state
supreme court implemented Ashwander principles).
130. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
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merely of legislative discretion.”131 Given the stories recounted in Part
I—which predate when Tumey was decided in 1927, and show a deeply
rooted antipathy toward judges who preside in the teeth of relational
conflicts and personal biases—the suggestion that kinship and bias did
not implicate core due process concerns can only be explained in terms
of the historical, pragmatic, and prudential constraints summarized here.
2. Disqualification
In the procedural dimension, disqualification rules seek to ensure
parties a fair hearing by affording them an opportunity to challenge the
impartiality of their assigned judge. As previously noted,
disqualification rules likewise serve as standards of conduct in the
ethical dimension of impartiality.132 Those standards are more or less
uniform across state and federal systems,133 and between procedural and
ethical dimensions,134 with the Model Code of Judicial Conduct serving
as a template.135 The Model Code makes provision to disqualify judges
for many of the chronic partiality problems recounted in Part I. Personal
and relational conflicts of interest are addressed by rules requiring
disqualification when the judge or the judge’s close relatives are
parties,136 lawyers,137 or material witnesses138 in a case; when they have
an economic139 or other interest140 in the outcome of the proceeding;
under limited circumstances, when the firm141 or governmental entity142
where the judge previously worked appears before her; and when a
judge as a judicial candidate receives campaign contributions from
131. Id. at 523.
132. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
133. See ABA Judicial Disqualification Project, Taking Disqualification Seriously, 92
JUDICATURE 12, 14–15 (2008).
134. For example, the standards for disqualification in 28 U.S.C. § 455, which grants
parties a procedural right to challenge a judge’s partiality, are basically the same as the
standards in Canon 3C of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, which regulates
disqualification as a matter of judicial ethics. See also GEYH, DISQUALIFICATION, supra note
105, at 2.
135. ABA Judicial Disqualification Project, supra note 133, at 14 (noting that state codes
of judicial conduct are based on the Model Code of Judicial Conduct “in the vast majority of
states”).
136. MODEL CODE, supra note 92, R. 2.11(A)(2)(a).
137. Id. R. 2.11(A)(2)(b).
138. Id. R. 2.11(A)(2)(d).
139. Id. R. 2.11(A)(3).
140. Id. R. 2.11(A)(2)(c).
141. Id. R. 2.11(A)(6)(a) (requiring disqualification when the judge “was associated with a
lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such association”).
142. Id. R. 2.11(A)(6)(b) (requiring disqualification when the judge “served in governmental
employment, and in such capacity participated personally and substantially as a lawyer or public
official concerning the proceeding”).
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parties or lawyers in excess of a specified amount.143 Political conflicts
of interest are likewise addressed in part by this last rule, insofar as
campaign contributions are perceived as an external source of political
influence on judicial decision making, and by a rule requiring
disqualification when a judge publicly pre-commits herself to reach a
particular result in a future case.144 Finally, bias is addressed by rules
requiring disqualification when the judge “has a personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer.”145
Disqualification is subject to some of the same constraints that shape
the scope of due process. Historically, judges have enjoyed the same
presumption of impartiality that limits the application of due process
analysis.146 Pragmatically, the subjective nature of judicial bias has
limited its reach as a traditional ground for disqualification.147
More fundamentally, perhaps, the same judges who administer
disqualification rules self-identify collectively as impartial and have
done so for millennia; to concede bias under such circumstances is, in
effect, to concede failure.148 To offset these constraints, the Model Code
calls for disqualification when the judge’s “impartiality might
reasonably be questioned,”149 which seeks to avoid problematic
inquiries into the judge’s subjective state of mind with an objective
standard, and to lessen the stigma of disqualification by focusing on
perceived partiality, rather than partiality in fact.150 Because judges are
under a separate ethical directive to avoid perceived partiality (as a
subset of the duty to avoid the appearance of impropriety), however,
judicial ambivalence over disqualification lingers.151 One multistate
study showed that judges are least troubled by disqualification for

143. Id. R. 2.11(A)(4).
144. Id. R. 2.11(A)(5).
145. Id. R. 2.11(A)(1).
146. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 361 (“[J]udges
or justices cannot be challenged,” because “the law will not suppose a possibility of bias or
favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority
greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.”).
147. FLAMM, supra note 9, § 3.2 (discussing proof problems limiting disqualification for
actual bias).
148. See Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters, supra note 117, at 678–79.
149. MODEL CODE, supra note 92, R. 2.11(A).
150. Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters, supra note 117, at 690–92.
151. MODEL CODE, supra note 92, R. 1.2 cmt. 5 (directing judges to avoid the appearance
of impropriety, and explaining that “[t]he test” for an appearance of impropriety is, among other
things, “whether the [judge’s] conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception” that
“reflects adversely on the judge’s . . . impartiality”); see also Geyh, Why Judicial
Disqualification Matters, supra note 117, at 703–04 (discussing tension between the appearance
of partiality in disqualification proceedings, and the ethical directive to avoid the appearance of
impropriety).
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traditional conflicts of interest,152 where the rules are relatively clear,
and disqualification is automatic when facts giving rise to a conflict are
present—for example, when the judge holds stock in the defendant
corporation, or the judge’s brother is the plaintiff. Conversely,
ambivalence rises with more discretionary inquiries into the judge’s
biases or personal relationships with case participants.153 Simply put,
because disqualification rules require judges to rule on the partiality of
their brethren, and often themselves, judicial construction of those rules
can be expected to err on the side of the presumption of impartiality.
3. Rules of Litigation Procedure
The law that regulates the way judges decide cases is embodied in
procedural rules and statutes that, with exceptions, regulate judicial
partiality only indirectly. One obvious exception is state and federal
disqualification rules and statutes, which I have already touched upon.
A second exception is the judicial oath of office, which, in the federal
system at least, is situated among procedural statutes regulating the
courts, and pursuant to which judges swear to discharge their duties
impartially.154
More generally, however, the law governing litigation procedure
implements an adversarial system by means of rules that manage
judicial partiality more subtly. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) abandoned the complex formalities of common law pleading
that had thwarted litigants from getting their cases heard on the merits
by, among other things, reducing the multiplicity of common law causes
of action to a single civil action,155 and reducing the plaintiff’s burden
of initial pleading to supplying “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”156
The paradigmatic merits determination in suits at common law is the
jury verdict, which follows a trial where the judge officiates between
adversaries. As previously noted, rigorous procedures seek to ensure the
impartiality of jurors as fact finders, as contrasted with judges, who
enjoy a more robust presumption of impartiality in their traditional role
as umpires on questions of law.157 While the FRCP afford judges
opportunities to decide cases on the merits prior to trial, those
152. JEFFREY SHAMAN & JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF JUDICIAL PRACTICES AND ATTITUDES 69 (1995) (“[T]he survey showed a sensitivity to
conflicts of interest and a concern for judicial impartiality”).
153. Id. at 1.
154. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2006) (“I, ___, do solemnly swear . . . that I will faithfully and
impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me . . . .”).
155. FED. R. CIV. P. 2.
156. Id. at 8(a).
157. See supra note 117–119 and accompanying text.
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opportunities are carefully circumscribed to reduce the risk of
uninformed, premature judgments that could fairly be characterized as
prejudice. Thus, for example, in a defendant’s motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, the judge must accept as true all facts alleged in
the complaint, and must err on the side of non-dismissal by construing
the complaint liberally and “draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in
plaintiff’s favor.”158 And at the summary judgment stage, the judge
must let the case proceed to trial unless there is “no genuine dispute as
to any material fact.”159
At an elemental level, then, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the adversarial process it regulates restrict the authority of judges to act
upon their predispositions, prejudices, and personal biases by sharply
limiting their opportunities to end cases before the necessary facts can
be adduced and the merits explored. Professor Judith Resnik described
the underlying problem as one of prejudgment:
Deciding at one point in time versus another is not
intrinsically faulty unless the assumption is that
prejudgment is based upon incomplete or inaccurate
information. Prejudgment is suspect in the context of a
system that assumes an increase in information over time
and designates specific points in time when the act of
judging becomes legitimate.160
By necessary implication, prejudgment is illegitimate because judges
who lack the information needed to make reasoned determinations on
the merits must ground their decisions in under-informed speculation
that is prejudiced (and hence, partial) by definition.161 Professor Lon
Fuller credited the adversarial process with imposing a structure that
controls the judge’s propensity toward premature decisions grounded in
personal predilections:
An adversary presentation seems the only effective
means for combating this natural human tendency to judge
too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet
fully known. The arguments of counsel hold the case, as it
were, in suspension between two opposing interpretations
of it. While the proper classification of the case is thus kept
unresolved, there is time to explore all of its peculiarities
158. 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.34(1)(b) (3d ed.
2012).
159. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
160. Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our
Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1885 (1988).
161. See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text.
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and nuances.162
Appellate review operates as another indirect procedural check on
partiality. Appellate review is commonly justified in terms of the need
to correct lower court errors.163 To the extent that such errors were
caused by judicial partiality, obviously enough, the appellate process
corrects those errors, too.164 In mandamus proceedings, when partiality
leads to errors so egregious as to constitute usurpations of judicial
power, circuit courts have sometimes admonished district judges for
their lack of impartiality.165 In addition to reversing erroneous rulings
that may have been the product of a partial judge, federal circuit courts
of appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court are authorized by statute to
remand actions and “require such further proceedings to be had as may
be just under the circumstances.”166 The circuit courts of appeal have
construed this as permitting remand to a different district judge when
the circuit court is concerned about the impartiality of the judge to
whom the case was originally assigned.167
As noted at the outset of this Section on the procedural dimension of
impartiality, judges have a system to run, which operates as a constraint
on the application of procedures aimed at curbing partiality to the extent
that such procedures are in tension with the “speedy[] and inexpensive
determination” of civil actions.168 Procedures that defer resolution of
cases on the merits pending discovery or trial reduce the risk of
premature judgment at the expense of protracting proceedings for what
may be a very busy court and cost-conscious parties. As elaborated
upon in Part IV, the Supreme Court’s recent reinterpretation of pleading
standards has made this constraint increasingly salient in the past
generation.

162. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 383
(1978).
163. GENE SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE 479 (4th
ed. 2009) (“One purpose of appeal is to ensure the correctness of lower court dispositions.”).
164. At common law, where disqualification for bias was not permitted, appeal was
recognized as the primary remedy for parties victimized by judicial partiality. McCauley v.
Weller, 12 Cal. 500, 523–24 (Cal. 1859) (explaining that jurors are disqualified more readily
than judges and that the premature “expression of an unqualified opinion on the merits” will
disqualify a juror, but not a judge, because a judge’s decisions are subject to appeal).
165. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 243, 297–302 (1993).
166. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2006).
167. See GEYH, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION, supra note 105, at 109–13 (2010) (discussing
the circumstances in which circuit courts have reassigned cases to a different judge under
§ 2106).
168. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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B. Regulating Impartiality in the Ethical Dimension
In the ethical dimension, impartiality is an end in itself for the good
judge. The ethics of impartiality are managed primarily by codes of
judicial conduct and the disciplinary processes that implement them.
Elaborating on the ways such codes operate in the ethical dimension
is simplified by the fact that the Code of Conduct for United States
Judges and the codes of judicial conduct for virtually every state
judiciary are derived, to varying degrees, from the American Bar
Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct.169 Conversely,
describing the role of the codes is complicated by the different niches
the codes occupy in state and federal systems. The Model Code
envisions being used in the manner state systems use it: as a guide to
judges on their ethical obligations and as a basis for enforcement in
disciplinary proceedings if the Code is violated.170 The federal system,
in contrast, uses the Code primarily as a tool for guidance.171 While the
Judicial Conference has acknowledged that sometimes Code violations
can serve as a basis for discipline,172 the disciplinary process in the
federal system operates independently of the Code and subjects judges
to limited forms of discipline for “conduct prejudicial to the effective
and expeditious administration of the business of the courts.”173
Either way, however, codes of conduct intersect with impartiality in
the ethical dimension. The preamble to the Model Code declares its goal
to “assist judges in maintaining the highest standards of judicial and
personal conduct,”174 and, to that end, the first Canon in the Code
directs judges to “uphold and promote the . . . impartiality of the
judiciary.”175
The Model Code of Judicial Conduct is replete with rules directing
judges to avoid conduct that jeopardizes judicial impartiality in each of
the four persistent problem areas described in Part I. In addition to the
Code’s disqualification rule—which, as previously described, does
double duty in the procedural dimension and includes provisions
applicable to each problem area176—additional rules elaborate in more
targeted ways on a judge’s ethical obligation to avoid specific partiality
169. Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s
Impartiality “Might Reasonably Be Questioned,” 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 55 (2000)
(noting that forty-nine states have adopted some form of the ABA Model Code).
170. MODEL CODE, supra note 92, pmbl. para. 3.
171. Id.
172. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIALDISABILITY PROCEEDINGS 28 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/library/judicialmis
conduct/jud_conduct_and_disability_308_app_B_rev.pdf.
173. 28 U.S.C § 351.
174. MODEL CODE, supra note 92, pmbl. para. 3.
175. Id. Canon 1.
176. See supra notes 133–153 and accompanying text.
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problems.177
By virtue of addressing the same partiality problems enumerated in
Part I, regulatory mechanisms in the procedural and ethical dimensions
undeniably overlap. Some rules in the Model Code explicitly admonish
judges to act impartially and to avoid conduct that calls their
impartiality into question.178 If a judge is sanctioned for violating one of
these rules in the context of a pending case, the ethical lapse would
seem to furnish irrefutable proof that the judge’s “impartiality might
reasonably be questioned” for parties seeking disqualification, thereby
creating a bridge between the ethical and procedural dimensions.
Areas of overlap notwithstanding, impartiality is regarded and
regulated differently in the two dimensions. Some conduct that is
deemed problematic in the ethical dimension of impartiality is not
necessarily problematic in the procedural dimension. There are rules in
the Model Code that regulate impartiality less than explicitly, through
prophylactic restrictions on judicial speech or conduct that poses an
unacceptable risk of real or perceived partiality. For example, the Code
directs judges not to “initiate, permit, or consider ex parte
communications,” and does so because ex parte communications
jeopardize impartiality by affording a party one-sided access to the
judge, thereby aligning the judge with that party.179 Another rule
177. Personal conflicts: MODEL CODE, supra note 92, R. 2.4(B) (prohibiting financial
interests from influencing the judge’s conduct); id. R. 3.11(B), (C) (prohibiting continuing
business relationships with people likely to come before the judge); id. R. 3.13 (restricting gifts
judges may receive). Relational conflicts: id. R. 2.4(B) (prohibiting family and social
relationships from affecting a judge’s judgment). Political conflicts: id. R. 2.4(A), (C)
(prohibiting judges from being “swayed by public clamor or fear of criticism,” and from
allowing political interests or relationships to influence their conduct); id. R. 2.2 cmt. 2
(directing judges to “interpret and apply the law without regard to whether the judge approves or
disapproves of the law in question”); id. Canon 4 (prohibiting judges from engaging in political
activities that are “inconsistent with the . . . impartiality of the judiciary”). Bias: id. R. 2.3(B)
(directing judges to avoid bias and prejudice on the basis of race, ethnicity, sex, sexual
orientation, socioeconomic status, etc.); id. R. 3.6(A) (prohibiting judicial membership in
private organizations that practice invidious discrimination).
178. See, e.g., id. R. 1.2 (directing the judge to “act at all times in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the . . . impartiality of the judiciary”); id. R. 2.2 (directing the judge to
“perform all duties of judicial office . . . impartially”); id. R. 2.11 (requiring disqualification “in
any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned”); id. R. 2.13
(directing the judge to “exercise the power of appointment impartially”); id. R. 3.1 (directing the
judge not to “participate in activities that would appear to a reasonable person to undermine the
judge’s . . . impartiality”); id. R. 3.13 (directing the judge not to “accept any gifts, loans,
bequests, benefits, or other things of value, if acceptance . . . would appear to a reasonable
person to undermine the judge’s . . . impartiality”); id. Canon 4 (directing the judge not to
“engage in political or campaign activity that is inconsistent with the . . . impartiality of the
judiciary”).
179. Id. R. 2.9; JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 5-1 (4th ed. 2007)
(explaining that ex parte communications are prohibited because “the judge may be exposed to
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admonishes judges to avoid making “any public statement that might
reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a
matter pending or impending,” which an accompanying comment
explains is “essential to the maintenance of the . . . impartiality of the
judiciary.”180 Sometimes, judges who make improper ex parte
communications or public statements on pending cases are ordered to
disqualify themselves,181 but not always. As one treatise has
summarized the state of the law: “Out-of-court comments about a
pending case, like ex parte conversations, are prohibited for other
reasons, but they will not be considered disqualifying on the basis of
impermissible bias unless they go too far.”182
In the ethical dimension, ex parte communications (with enumerated
exceptions) are categorically improper because of the threat they pose to
the judge’s real or perceived impartiality. But in the procedural
dimension, such communications do not justify the comparably
categorical conclusion that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned for purposes of disqualification. Rather, the communications
must be evaluated case by case to see if they go “too far.” Similarly,
public comments on pending cases that are improper in the ethical
dimension do not trigger automatic disqualification in the procedural
dimension; disqualification is largely limited to bias emanating from an
extrajudicial source, because it is to be expected that judges will form
views about claims and parties during judicial proceedings. Unless a
judge’s public comments reveal extrajudicial bias or an utter incapacity
to be fair, disqualification is unwarranted.183 Viewed another way,
judges who adopt and enforce codes of conduct in the ethical dimension
only one side of an argument or an isolated source of information, to the detriment of the
judge’s impartiality”); FLAMM, supra note 9, at 374 (“[W]henever a judge initiates or entertains
ex parte communications, a question may reasonably be raised about his ability to be impartial
in disposing of questions germane to the subject of such communications. It is, therefore,
ordinarily considered improper for a judge to either initiate or consider such communications
during the course of a proceeding, except to the limited extent authorized by law.”).
180. MODEL CODE, supra note 92, R. 2.10 & cmt. 1.
181. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 116–18 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(requiring disqualification for statements to reporters); FLAMM, supra note 9, at 374–75
(“[W]here a judge violates this rule [against ex parte communications], he is ordinarily obliged
to recuse himself from presiding over that proceeding . . . .”).
182. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 179, at 4-24; see also FLAMM, supra note 9, at 406 & n.2
(“[T]he fact that a judge has engaged in ex parte communications, standing alone, is not
necessarily sufficient to warrant disqualification . . . .”); LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION UNDER CANON 3C OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 27, 29–30 (2d ed.
1986).
183. United States v. Barry, 961 F.2d 260, 263–65 (D.C. Cir. 1992); ALFINI ET AL., supra
note 179, at 4-24 (“Even strong statements made out-of-court about a pending case are not
disqualifying if they do not stem from an extrajudicial source and so long as they do not go so
far as to show that the judge’s mind is closed.”).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2014

33

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 4

526

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

apply prophylactic standards to guide good judges away from conduct
that could impugn their impartiality, whereas judges in the procedural
dimension are subject to the added constraints of having dockets to
manage and a system to administer, which counsels against the
application of disqualification rules that are any broader than necessary
to assure parties a fair hearing in the case in question.
Conversely, some conduct that is deemed problematic in the
procedural dimension of impartiality is not problematic in the ethical
dimension. As previously noted, across state and federal systems,
disqualification is a matter of ethics and procedure.184 Even though
procedural and ethical disqualification directives are essentially the
same,185 the application of those directives is not. Whereas a judge is
subject to disqualification in the procedural dimension when her
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, irrespective of the judge’s
state of mind, she is subject to discipline in the ethical dimension only
when non-disqualification is willful—that is, when she knew or should
have known that disqualification was necessary.186 In the procedural
dimension, parties are entitled to a fair process featuring an impartial
judge, which is a goal that is compromised when the disqualification
standard is met. A good judge likewise disqualifies herself when the
disqualification standard is met, but good judges make honest
mistakes—mistakes made all the more understandable by a separate
ethical directive that admonishes judges to decide the cases they are
assigned unless disqualification is required—out of respect for the
administrative burdens that unnecessary disqualifications pose.187
The conclusion that erroneous non-disqualification sometimes spells
trouble in the procedural dimension before it does so in the ethical
dimension is consonant with the more general principle that when
judges make honest mistakes, the appropriate remedy is appeal, not
discipline.188 To reverse judges for honest mistakes is salutary; to
punish judges for honest mistakes threatens their decisional
independence.189 Although state judges have an ethical duty to “uphold
and apply the law,”190 errors are subject to reversal, not discipline,
184. See supra notes 133–135 and accompanying text.
185. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 455, with CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES,
CANON 3C (2011) (showing that rules are almost identical in many respects).
186. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 179, at 4-3 (“[A] judge will be subject to discipline (as
distinct from reversal on appeal) for incorrectly failing to disqualify himself only where the
failure was willful.”).
187. MODEL CODE, supra note 92, R. 2.7 & cmt. 1 (directing that judges must “decide [all]
matters assigned to the judge, except when disqualification is required,” because of “the burdens
that may be imposed on a judge’s colleagues” by “unwarranted disqualification”).
188. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 179, at 1-11.
189. Id. at 2-4.
190. MODEL CODE, supra note 92, R. 2.2.
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unless the errors are so egregious or chronic as to manifest bad faith or
incompetence.191
Drilling the matter down to the bedrock, impartiality promotes good
process in one dimension and good judges in the other. Incursions on
perfect impartiality will be tolerable or not, depending on which
objective is at issue and the constraints to which the applicable system
of regulation is subject. In both dimensions, a judge is often exposed as
partial through her speech or associations. In the procedural dimension,
the speech and associations of a partial judge have consequences for the
process: parties are entitled to disqualification or reversal. In the ethical
dimension, such speech and associations have consequences for the
judge, who is subject to discipline or (in state systems) removal. A core
constraint on the regulation of judicial impartiality through codes of
judicial conduct and disciplinary processes, then, is constitutional;
codes of conduct seek to preserve impartiality by restricting judicial
speech and expressive conduct, which judges and judicial candidates
have sometimes challenged as a violation of their First Amendment
rights.192
When codes of conduct restrict judicial speech on the basis of its
content, the restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny.193 While promoting
judicial impartiality is recognized as a compelling state interest, in the
aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, state and federal courts have looked more closely at
whether code restrictions on judicial speech promote impartiality with
sufficient precision. In White, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a rule
in the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct, derived from the 1972
Model Code, which forbade judges and judicial candidates from
announcing their views on issues that could come before them as
judges, on the grounds that the rule did not further the purported goal of
promoting judicial impartiality.194 In the aftermath of White, First
Amendment challenges to code provisions that restrict speech for the
sake of preserving judicial impartiality have continued apace.
Uncertainty abounds. Some courts have invalidated rules that prohibited
judges from pledging, promising, or committing to decide future cases
in particular ways, while others have upheld them. Some courts have
invalidated rules that prohibited judges from soliciting campaign
contributions directly from donors, while others have upheld them. And
191. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 179, at 2-4–2-15. In the federal system, the issue is
resolved by the disciplinary statute itself, which directs chief judges to dismiss judicial conduct
complaints that are “directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 352(b)(1)(A)(ii).
192. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002).
193. Id. at 774.
194. Id. at 787–88.
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some courts have invalidated rules that prohibited judges from engaging
in partisan political activities of various kinds, while, yet again, others
have upheld them.195
In the ethical dimension, then, codes of judicial conduct sometimes
regulate judicial partiality by prohibiting judicial speech, while in the
procedural dimension, a judge’s speech is not prohibited, but the baleful
effects of that speech on the parties’ rights to a fair hearing can be
ameliorated by the judicial process. As a consequence, it may be
problematic under the First Amendment to reprimand a judge for
making statements to the detriment of her perceived impartiality, but not
to disqualify her from a case for doing so. Litigants insensitive to this
distinction between dimensions have argued that the First Amendment
prohibits the disqualification of judges for announcing views they have
a First Amendment right to express, and have convinced at least one
court that they are right.196 More recently, however, the Supreme Court
has ruled that the right of public officials to speak their minds does not
subsume a right to act upon those views in their official capacity,197
which should put this small piece of the larger dispute to rest.
Regulatory structures in the procedural and ethical dimensions are
routinely brought to bear against many of the chronic partiality
problems described in Part I, but are ill-equipped to tackle more
pervasive problems the public regards as systemic. Part of the difficulty
lies in the piecemeal orientation of these mechanisms. Granting this
litigant’s request for disqualification or disciplining that judge for an
appearance of bias does little to allay entrenched suspicions that judges
categorically are under the thrall of their political ideology,
socioeconomic status, gender, or race. Rules of ethics categorically
prohibit judges from becoming so enthralled,198 and rules of procedure
subject individual judges to disqualification when it occurs.199 But the
default position in the ethical and procedural dimensions is to presume
that judges are impartial until that presumption is rebutted with
demonstrable proof to the contrary. Moreover, rules of ethics and
procedure are enforced against judges by other judges, which skeptical
observers may regard as so many foxes guarding the henhouse. To
address these more diffuse and systemic concerns for the benefit of a
195. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Criticism and Speech of Judges in the United States, in
JUDICIARIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 257, 271 & nn.52–58 (H.P. Lee ed., 2011) (citing
and discussing cases).
196. See James Bopp, Jr. & Anita Y. Woudenberg, An Announce Clause by Any Other
Name: The Unconstitutionality of Disciplining Judges Who Fail to Disqualify Themselves for
Exercising Their Freedom to Speak, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 723, 724 (2007); Duwe v. Alexander,
490 F. Supp. 2d 968, 976 (W.D. Wis. 2007).
197. Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 1, 9 (2011).
198. See MODEL CODE, supra note 92, R. 2.2 cmt. 2.
199. FLAMM, supra note 9, at 274.
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public whose confidence in the courts may swing in the balance,
regulatory mechanisms in the procedural and ethical dimensions of
impartiality are supplemented by an array of devices in the political
dimension.
C. Regulating Judicial Impartiality in the Political Dimension
The unifying feature of structures that regulate impartiality in the
political dimension is that those structures are implemented by the
public or the public’s elected representatives for the purpose of
promoting the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy within the body
politic. Such structures are logically subdivided into three categories:
(1) mechanisms for judicial removal, (2) mechanisms for judicial
selection, and (3) mechanisms for judicial oversight. These structures
can be used to enhance the judiciary’s legitimacy in a variety of ways
that include but are not limited to promoting public confidence in the
judiciary’s impartiality. For example, judicial removal, selection, and
oversight can also enhance the public’s faith in the courts by policing
judicial honesty, integrity, competence, diligence, and temperament.
The focus in this Section, however, is on the ways in which the political
dimension regulates the four persistent partiality problem areas outlined
in Part I.
The political dimension is uniquely equipped to address partiality
problems that citizens and their representatives regard as troublesome,
but which judges—who oversee regulation in the procedural and ethical
dimensions—do not, or which are otherwise ill-suited for remediation
outside of the political dimension because of constraints under which
regulation in other dimensions operate. Of particular relevance here are
suspicions that broad segments of the judiciary are captured by their
biases or political interests, which, despite being concerns of long
standing, go largely unaddressed in litigation and disciplinary settings.
With respect to the most publicized and pervasive of these public
suspicions—that judges allow their ideological interests to subvert the
rule of law—regulation in the political dimension manifests an inherent
tension, in which one form of partiality is discouraged by encouraging
another: public or political branch controls on judicial decision making
seek to discourage judges from acting on their internal political interests
in ways that could compromise their impartiality, and do so by
encouraging judges to respond to political pressure and thereby act on
their external political interests in ways that could compromise their
impartiality. Insofar as regulation in this arena curtails one form of
partiality by exacerbating another to the end of optimizing public
confidence in the courts, delegating the task of striking the preferred
balance to the public and its elected representatives (subject to the broad
constitutional limits outlined below) has intuitive appeal.
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This is, in effect, another way of framing the perpetual struggle
between the decisional form of judicial independence and judicial
accountability, which scholars (myself included) have explored
elsewhere.200 There are, however, three reasons to recast this piece of
the independence–accountability debate in terms of judicial impartiality.
First, the harms that independence and accountability seek to prevent
can fairly be characterized as forms of judicial partiality: independence
aims to insulate judges from external threats or blandishments that
could impair judges’ impartial judgment, while accountability aims to
ensure that judges do not allow their internal biases to compromise their
impartial judgment. Second, disputants in the independence–
accountability debate justify their positions in terms of the need for
judicial impartiality: court defenders have objected that threats to
remove judges on account of their decisions will undermine judicial
impartiality;201 court critics have argued that thwarting Senate
confirmation of “activist” judges is necessary to ensure that judges
impartially uphold the law;202 and defenders and critics alike have
rationalized their efforts to subject judges to or liberate judges from
political branch controls in terms of the need to promote judicial
impartiality.203 Third, situating the struggle between decisional
independence and judicial accountability in a political dimension of
impartiality makes it possible to analyze that struggle in a broader
context that integrates procedure, ethics, and politics.
1. Mechanisms for Judicial Removal
Removal mechanisms serve as a bridge between the ethical and
political dimensions of impartiality. In the federal system, the sole
200. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Rescuing Judicial Accountability from the Realm of
Political Rhetoric, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 911, 915–17 (2006) (likening the relationship
between judicial independence and accountability to that of yin and yang); Stephen B. Burbank,
The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315, 339–40 (1999) (describing
independence and accountability as different sides of the same coin).
201. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, In Rare Appearance, 2 Justices Concur in Threats to
Neutrality, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1998, at A2 (“Several speakers in the weekend conference here
said the overall trend [of proposing to impeach judges for their decisions] threatens the
impartiality that is the hallmark of the courts and can lead judges to look over their shoulders.”).
202. Sean Lengell, Republican Filibuster Blocks Liu for Appeals Court, WASHINGTON
TIMES, May 20, 2011, at A2 (explaining that Senate Republicans filibustered circuit court
nominee Goodwin Liu because “Mr. Liu’s legal writings ‘reveal a left-wing ideologue who
views the role of a judge not as that of an impartial arbiter, but as someone who views the bench
as a position of power’”).
203. See, e.g., Editorial, Gingrich’s Threats Against Judges Go Way Beyond the Pale,
U.S.A. TODAY, Dec. 20, 2011, at 10A (characterizing proposal to disestablish courts staffed by
“activist” judges as antithetical to an impartial judiciary); Tom McClusky, Rein in Activist
Judges, U.S.A. TODAY, Aug. 2, 2006, at 8A (advocating various political branch controls on the
judiciary to preserve impartiality and independence).
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mechanism for judicial removal is the impeachment process.204
Impeachment is situated in the political dimension, as I have defined it,
by virtue of being a power within the sole authority of Congress to
exercise for the redress of “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors”205—offenses The Federalist characterized as “political”
in nature and constituting an “abuse or violation of some public
trust.”206 Impeachment, however, is logically connected to the ethical
dimension too, insofar as conduct that the judiciary deems bad enough
to warrant discipline can be bad enough to undermine public trust and
warrant impeachment. Accordingly, the ultimate disciplinary sanction
that federal statute authorizes the judiciary to impose in the ethical
dimension is to refer a matter to the House of Representatives for a
possible impeachment inquiry in the political dimension.207
Impeachable offenses do not always implicate judicial partiality—
Judge Harry Claiborne, for example, was impeached and removed for
tax evasion,208 which impugned his integrity, but not necessarily his
commitment to deciding cases without bias or prejudice (except,
perhaps, tax evasion cases). Nevertheless, of the few judicial
impeachments that have been prosecuted to conclusion, several have
concerned judges who, returning to the typology detailed in Part I,
allegedly had their impartiality compromised by personal or relational
interests in matters that they decided.209
In state systems, the primary mechanism for judicial removal is the
disciplinary process.210 I have previously situated judicial discipline in
the ethical dimension because it is the means by which judicial systems
204. See Peter M. Shane, Who May Discipline or Remove Federal Judges? A
Constitutional Analysis, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 209, 213, 215–18, 220–22 (1993).
205. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
206. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 358 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott, ed.).
207. 28 U.S.C. § 351 et seq. (2006).
208. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 36, at 168–69 (1999).
209. Judges impeached for personal interests include Judges Robert Archbald, who was
impeached and removed for cultivating business relationships with prospective litigants.
CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL
OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 150 (2006) [hereinafter GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS
COLLIDE]. Alcee Hastings was impeached and removed for soliciting a bribe. EMILY FIELD VAN
TASSEL, WHY JUDGES RESIGN: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL SERVICE 1789 TO 1992 81
(1993) [hereinafter VAN TASSEL, WHY JUDGES RESIGN]. G. Thomas Porteous was impeached
and removed for soliciting payment from a lawyer in a pending case. CQ WEEKLY, supra note
37. Judges impeached for relational interests include Walter Nixon, who was impeached and
removed for perjury after falsely denying that he intervened on a friend’s behalf to secure the
dismissal of a case. VAN TASSEL, WHY JUDGES RESIGN, supra, at 101. Halsted Ritter was
impeached, but removed on an omnibus count, for awarding excessive sums to a law partner.
GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE, supra, at 151. And George English was impeached
and then resigned for, among other things, securing a position for his son with a bank holding
bankruptcy funds under the judge’s control. Id. at 150–51.
210. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 179, at 15-1.
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enforce codes of judicial conduct to the end of calling judges to task for
bad behavior that subsumes various forms of partiality. Self-policing in
this way can simultaneously promote public confidence in the courts,
but other mechanisms for judicial removal are more clearly
denominated political because they are controlled by non-judicial
actors. In addition to impeachment processes, various states employ
such removal mechanisms as: the legislative address, which authorizes
the legislature to seek the removal of a judge by petitioning the
governor; automatic removal of a judge upon conviction of specified
crimes, which gives the executive branch a role to play in judicial
removal through criminal prosecution; and judicial recall, in which the
electorate is enabled to seek the removal of a judge in special
elections.211
Mechanisms for judicial removal in the political dimension operate
under the constraint of being cumbrous by constitutional design; these
mechanisms authorize political branch encroachments on the tenure,
and hence the autonomy, of the judiciary, and their unwieldiness
operates as a check against overuse.212 For example, removal by
impeachment in the federal system and in most states requires an
impeachment upon a majority vote by one chamber of the legislature
followed by a trial and conviction upon a supermajority vote in the
other chamber.213 As a consequence, to the extent that impeachment has
been brought to bear as a remedy for judicial partiality, it has been
reserved for egregious personal or relational conflicts on the order of
corruption or indictable crimes.214 In contrast, efforts to characterize
highhanded decision making as an impeachable usurpation of power in
which the judge’s duty to impartially uphold the law is compromised by
personal or political zeal have chronically failed.215
The role that these removal mechanisms play in policing judicial
conduct and promoting public confidence in the impartiality of the
judiciary, however, is not necessarily limited to those few cases in
which judges are removed by such mechanisms. When a judge is
threatened with impeachment, recall, or removal by legislative address,
it underscores the seriousness of the speaker’s concern and calls public
211. Id. at 15-1, 15-5, 15-9–15-12, 15-14–15-15.
212. Id. at 15-1–15-2.
213. Randy J. Holland & Cynthia Gray, Judicial Discipline: Independence with
Accountability, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 117, 121 (2000).
214. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 36, at 5–6, 13.
215. Since 1787, the House of Representatives has investigated at least thirty-two judges
for high-handed decision making. GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE, supra note 209,
at 119. Of those, four were impeached but only one, John Pickering, was removed. Id. at 125.
Pickering’s conviction is attributed largely to the judge’s insanity, not his decision making. VAN
TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 36, at 92 (“[H]is manifest disability undercut the precedential
value his removal had for establishing the validity of the Jeffersonian theory of impeachment.”).
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attention to the underlying partiality problem.216 Moreover, the threat
itself can chasten the judge in subtle and sometimes not so subtle ways.
For example, in 1996, United States District Judge Harold Baer
reversed his decision to suppress evidence in a drug case after being
threatened with impeachment for what House and Senate leaders
characterized as an “activist” ruling.217 In 2003, a Massachusetts
superior court judge resigned after a bill of legislative address was filed
because of a sentence she imposed in a kidnapping case.218 That same
year the Nevada chief justice survived a recall election over her decision
in a tax case, but resigned at the end of her term.219 Finally, recourse to
these mechanisms, even if only as a rhetorical device, offers court
critics an opportunity to target more categorical partiality problems. At
the start of the nineteenth century, for example, newly elected
Jeffersonian Republicans in Congress actively pursued impeachment as
a means to purge the judiciary of what they regarded as excessively
partisan judges appointed by the predecessor Federalist regime.220
Nearly two centuries later, newly elected congressional Republicans
proposed a campaign to impeach “liberal judicial activist[]” judges
appointed by prior administrations.221 In this way, the threat of removal
has been used to address more systemic concerns that judicial
impartiality has been compromised by partisan, political interests.
2. Mechanisms for Judicial Selection
In state systems, judges are selected by at least five different means,
involving various combinations of governors, commissions, legislatures,
and voters.222 Each of these participants can have a role to play in
evaluating a judicial candidate’s past or prospective impartiality as one
issue among many in judicial selection. As a practical matter, however,
216. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Choreography of Courts-Congress Conflicts, in THE
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE PUBLIC 19, 32–33 (Bruce
Peobody ed., 2011).
217. Don Van Natta, Jr., A Publicized Drug Courier Pleads Guilty to 3 Felonies, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 1996, at 23.
218. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 179, at 15-10.
219. See id. at 15-14.
220. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 36, at 91 (discussing Jeffersonian
Republicans’ campaign to remove “all of [the judges] . . . indiscriminately”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
221. GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE, supra note 209, at 3.
222. The five systems include: gubernatorial appointment; gubernatorial appointment from
a candidate pool selected by a judicial nominating commission (“merit selection”), typically
followed by periodic retention elections; partisan election; nonpartisan election; and legislative
appointment. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why it
Matters for Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1263 (2008) [hereinafter
Geyh, Endless Judicial Selection Debate]. For a summary of which states use what selection
methods, see http://www.judicialselection.us.
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the choices that governors and commissions make to exclude particular
judicial candidates are largely inscrutable, and legislatures have primary
responsibility for judicial selection in only two states.223 That leaves
voters, and because 80% of state judges stand for judicial elections of
some sort,224 the role that elections play in policing judicial impartiality
is the focus here.
Elections have one foot in judicial selection and the other in judicial
removal: in states with contested elections, the net effect of selecting a
challenger over an incumbent is to remove the incumbent from office;
in states with retention elections, the public’s role in judicial selection is
limited to deciding whether an incumbent should be removed to make
way for a new appointment. Either way, elections serve as a means to
police judicial impartiality. For example, candidates have been called to
task for their personal interest in making decisions that accommodate
the preferences of their campaign contributors,225 or for their relational
interest in presiding over cases in which the judge’s relatives had an
interest.226 Perhaps the most common partiality problem to surface in
recent judicial campaigns concerns claims that candidates have internal
political interests in the issues they will decide as judges that may trump
their commitment to follow the law. Examples abound in which judicial
candidates have been portrayed by their opponents as activists whose
commitment to impartially uphold the rule of law is compromised by
their ideological biases on such matters as same-sex marriage, the death
penalty, abortion, water rights, and tort reform.227
It is, of course, possible for judicial candidates to have principled
disagreements over the interpretation of constitutions and statutes or the
direction of the common law without implicating the impartiality of
either candidate. Moreover, serious scholars of judicial behavior have
refuted the premise that the rulings judges make are the product of
binary choices between law and politics.228 In the political dimension of
223. Geyh, Endless Judicial Selection Debate, supra note 222, at 1263.
224. ABA, PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 1 (2002).
225. See Toby Coleman, Massey CEO Gives $1.7 Million to Anti-Warren McGraw Group,
W. VA. CITIZEN ACTION GRP. (Oct. 15, 2004), http://www.wvcag.org/news/fair_use/2004/10_15
a.htm.
226. In a 2007 Wisconsin Supreme Court race, candidate Annette Ziegler was accused (as a
court of appeals judge) of presiding over cases in which her husband was affiliated with a
corporate party. See Viveca Novak & Emi Kolawole, Warring Ads in Wisconsin Supreme Court
Race: Ziegler and Clifford Sling Mud in the Dairy State, FACTCHECK.ORG (Mar. 30, 2007),
http://www.factcheck.org/judicial-campaigns/warring_ads_in_wisconsin_supreme_court_race.h
tml.
227. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Criticism and Speech of Judges in the United States, in
JUDICIARIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE supra note 57, at 265–66.
228. Lawrence Baum, Law and Policy: More and Less than a Dichotomy, in WHAT’S LAW
GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE, supra note
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impartiality, however, dichotomous debates over the “activist”
motivations of judicial candidates are a prominent feature of the
landscape in judicial campaigns.229 If a campaign becomes a
referendum on which candidate (or whether a given candidate) is
committed to impartially upholding the law in light of her views on
issue X, then it follows logically that the choices voters make in that
election can promote public confidence in the impartiality of the
judiciary.
The primary constraint on the capacity of elections to police
impartiality concerns the tension alluded to earlier: to the extent that
elections promote public confidence in an impartial judiciary by
reassuring voters that judges selected will impartially uphold the law as
voters understand it, elections do so by means that arguably undermine
judicial impartiality in other respects. First, the prospect of electoral
defeat is an external interest that can—and in the minds of ardent
judicial election proponents, should—influence the judge’s assessment
of the law and facts, to the detriment of the judge’s independence and
impartiality. Second, competitive elections are fueled by campaign
expenditures that create the perception that judges have a personal
financial interest in aligning their decisions with contributor
preferences. While worries about unaccountable judges run amok have
stalled a mid-twentieth century movement among the states to end
contested judicial elections,230 worries about elections run amok have
thwarted any movement in the opposite direction.231 Moreover, in
heated election campaigns where each side accuses the other of
sponsoring an ideological zealot, the conclusion that the electoral
process promotes public confidence in the impartiality of the judges
selected may be optimistic.232
98, at 71 (arguing that the law–policy dichotomy “oversimplifies the reality of judging”); Frank
Cross, Law is Politics, in id. at 92, 110 (arguing that the “complementary effect” of law and
politics on judicial decision making is “the strength of our judicial system”).
229. Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive?, supra note 59, at 216–17.
230. Geyh, Endless Judicial Selection Debate, supra note 222, at 1262 (noting that “the
merit selection movement has stalled”).
231. Campaigns have been launched in several states to replace merit selection systems
with contested elections. See id. To date, however, those efforts have failed. See History of
Reform Efforts: Unsuccessful Reform Efforts, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, http://www.judicialselect
ion.us/judicial_selection/reform_efforts/failed_reform_efforts.cfm?state= (last visited Dec. 18,
2012); Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial Selection Reconsidered: A Plea for Radical Moderation,
35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 623, 630–31 (arguing for incremental reform of judicial selection
“[w]hen, as now, the latest movement has run its course and the political will for fundamental
change is absent”).
232. Survey research suggests that contested elections foster general public support for the
courts. See JAMES L. GIBSON, ELECTING JUDGES: THE SURPRISING EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGNING ON
JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY 146–48 (2012). That, however, is an issue distinct from whether elections
engender confidence in the impartiality of the judges so selected.
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In the federal system, presidents often identify impartiality as a
quality they seek when choosing judicial nominees, while senators
rationalize their roles in confirmation proceedings in terms of assuring
that judges confirmed will impartially uphold the law.233 The Senate has
rejected nominees who exhibited financial interests in the cases they
decided, the most notable example being President Richard Nixon’s
failed Supreme Court nomination of Judge Clement Haynsworth, who
was voted down in part for presiding over cases in which he held stock
in corporate parties.234 Relational interests have been at issue with
nominees portrayed as cronies of the president—President George W.
Bush’s aborted Supreme Court nomination of his counsel, Harriet
Miers, being a recent example.235
Bias too has arisen as an issue: President Nixon’s nomination of
Judge G. Harrold Carswell to the Supreme Court was rejected, in part,
for evidence of racism.236 Conversely, President Jimmy Carter launched
a campaign to improve the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy by
diversifying the ranks of the district courts with more women and racial
minorities.237 There are two data points that suggest the possibility of a
relationship between such diversification efforts and the judiciary’s
impartiality in the political dimension. First, the perceived impartiality
of a largely white judiciary is much lower among African-Americans
than white Americans.238 Second, a judge’s race and gender inform
perspectives that influence outcomes in cases of special relevance to
members of the affected gender or race.239 Paradoxically, to
acknowledge this relationship openly is to risk overstating it, if the ideal
of an impartial judge is one impervious to extralegal influences; witness
Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s confirmation struggle in the wake of
statements she made that a “wise Latina judge” might decide cases
differently, and better, than a white male counterpart.240 And so, as
Professor Martha Minow has explained, claims that judges and the
233. See Davis, supra note 85.
234. Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARV. L. REV.
736, 736 & n.2 (1973).
235. GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE, supra note 209, at 206.
236. See id. at 203.
237. SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM
ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 243–44 (1997).
238. See DAVID B. ROTTMAN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, PERCEPTIONS OF THE
COURTS IN YOUR COMMUNITY: THE INFLUENCE OF EXPERIENCE, RACE AND ETHNICITY, FINAL
REPORT 10 (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/201302.pdf.
239. See Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense: A Social Psychological Study of
Iqbal’s Effect On Claims of Race Discrimination, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 60–61 (2011);
Edward A. Adams, Race & Gender of Judges Make Enormous Difference in Rulings, Studies
Find, A.B.A.J., Feb. 6, 2010.
240. Davis, supra note 85.
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judiciary are “enriched” by the diversity of experience that comes from
racial, ethnic, and gender differences are countered by claims that a
judge should be “stripped down like a runner” who sheds the biases of
his race and gender like so much clothing.241
As with elections in state systems, however, the federal appointment
process recently fixated on partiality manifested by the ideological
orientation of judicial nominees, to the end of purging the judiciary of
“activists” or “extremists,” whose internal political interests in case
outcomes compromise their allegiance to the rule of law.242 And as with
state judicial election campaigns, the campaign against activism waged
in confirmation proceedings has transcended attacks on individual
nominees and acquired a systemic focus, by seeking to ameliorate a
more pervasive suspicion that judges generally capitulate to their
ideological biases.243 Moreover, the countervailing concern is likewise
the same: the confirmation process, like the electoral process, is
ostensibly aimed at preserving public confidence in the judges so
selected, but may—through highly partisan attacks impugning the
impartiality of nominees from presidents of both parties—damage the
judiciary’s perceived legitimacy.244
From the perspective of social science, the “judicial activist”
bogeyman is a cartoonish distortion of reality. The adversarial process
presupposes that there is always more than one way to look at difficult
legal and factual questions. When the answers to such questions are
unclear, honorable judges must, of necessity, exercise discretion—
discretion that is informed by their life experience. And the data show
that such discretion can be influenced by a variety of factors, including
ideology, race, gender, and others.245 Campaigns to purge judicial
decision making of ideological influences are thus misinformed or
disingenuous. More reasonably conceived, such campaigns seek to
ensure that ideological influences on the exercise of judicial discretion
will fall within a politically acceptable range. To that extent, selection
processes are aimed at producing judges who will be impartial enough
to retain public support—and consistent with that objective, survey data
in state and federal systems show that public support for the courts
remains relatively strong.246
241. Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and
Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1201, 1201 (1992).
242. See GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE, supra note 209, at 214–21.
243. See id.
244. See Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive?, supra note 59, at 232.
245. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
246. See Keith J. Bybee, The Rule of Law is Dead! Long Live the Rule of Law!, in WHAT’S
LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE, supra
note 98, at 306, 310–11.
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3. Mechanisms for Judicial Oversight
In the state and federal systems, legislatures have varying degrees of
regulatory authority over judicial pay raises, court structure,
jurisdiction, budgets, administration, and procedure.247 These tools can
afford the political branches a role to play in the procedural and ethical
dimensions of impartiality. For example, in the federal system,
Congress has enacted legislation governing disqualification248 and
procedural rulemaking,249 which structures the manner in which courts
regulate impartiality in the procedural dimension. And Congress has
also enacted the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act,250 which is a
means by which the federal judiciary manages impartiality in the ethical
dimension.251
At their core, however, mechanisms for legislative oversight of the
courts are centered in the political dimension—mechanisms that can be
employed, or at least purportedly employed, for the purpose of
promoting public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary.
Congress, by virtue of its power to establish inferior courts, has broad
regulatory authority over the lower courts.252 To guard against
perceived partiality by state judges against out-of-state litigants,
Congress has, since 1789, authorized lower federal courts to exercise
jurisdiction over cases arising between citizens of different states,253 and
more recently has expanded diversity jurisdiction to provide defendants
greater access to federal forums in class actions.254 In 1891, Congress
established the circuit courts of appeals to control what congressional
committee reports characterized as district court “despotism,” that is,
unchecked judicial partiality toward personal or internal political
interests that impeded the rule of law.255 Legislation that limits
sentencing discretion—statutory minimums, maximums, and sentencing
guidelines, for example—curtails the authority of judges to act on their

247. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Elastic Nature of Judicial Independence and Judicial
Accountability, in THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 167, 168–71 (Gordon
M. Griller & E. Keith Stott, Jr. eds., ABA Press 7th ed. 2002) [hereinafter Geyh, The Elastic
Nature of Judicial Independence].
248. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006).
249. Id. §§ 2071–77.
250. Id. §§ 351–64.
251. See id.
252. Geyh, The Elastic Nature of Judicial Independence, supra note 247, at 168–69.
253. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
254. Id. § 1332(d).
255. JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 50-942, at 3–4
(1888), reprinted in 3 CONGRESS AND THE COURTS: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1787–1977, 4543,
4545–46 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. & Charles R. Haworth eds., 1978); Act of March 3, 1891, ch.
517, 26 Stat. 826.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss2/4

46

Geyh: The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality

2013]

THE DIMENSIONS OF JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY

539

ideological prejudices.256 And the campaign against judicial activism,
which Republican presidential candidates sought to revitalize in the
2012 presidential campaign, has included proposals to discourage
partiality toward judges’ internal political interests by disestablishing or
cutting the budgets of uncooperative courts, freezing judicial salaries,
and depriving judges of jurisdiction to hear controversial cases.257 Many
state legislatures have undertaken to regulate their respective judiciaries
in similar ways toward similar ends by manipulating judicial salaries
and budgets and proposing to curtail subject matter jurisdiction and
judicial review.258
The authority of legislatures to regulate judicial impartiality through
oversight is subject to constitutional and normative constraints. As to
constitutional constraints, Article III limits legislative control over
judicial tenure and salaries, and the judiciary’s exclusive constitutional
authority to exercise judicial power bars Congress from overturning
judgments by legislation.259 Congress’s authority to establish (and by
negative implication disestablish) the lower courts does not extend to
the U.S. Supreme Court, where congressional authority is limited to
making regulations and exceptions incident to the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction260 and exercising whatever additional powers are implied by
the Necessary and Proper Clause.261 Many state constitutions grant their
judicial systems greater institutional separation and independence than
their federal counterpart, which can further limit legislatures’ regulatory
authority over state court operations.262 As to normative constraints, I
have argued elsewhere that over the course of the nineteenth century,
Congress gradually internalized judicial independence norms that
constrained its political will to control judges and their decision making
to the full extent authorized by the U.S. Constitution.263 The net effect
was to render less viable tools seemingly at Congress’s disposal to
chasten judges whose internal political interests in the outcomes of
cases they decided compromised their impartiality.264
256. See GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE, supra note 209, at 268–69.
257. Id. at 3–4.
258. Emily Field Van Tassel, Challenges to Constitutional Decisions of State Courts and
Institutional Pressures on State Judiciaries, in ALFRED P. CARLTON, JR., JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY:
REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY
app. E, at 6–10 (2003).
259. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
260. See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
261. See id. at 233–34; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (defining the
Necessary and Proper Clause).
262. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Elastic Nature of Judicial Independence, supra note 247,
at 170.
263. See GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE, supra note 209, at 10–14.
264. Id. at 254–55.
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IV. PONDERING IMPONDERABLES AND TRACKING TRENDS
Professors Stephen Burbank and Barry Friedman reconceptualized
judicial independence with the insight that the judiciary’s independence
is not monolithic; it has different forms, different meanings, and
different applications in different contexts.265 The same may be said of
judicial impartiality. Describing judicial impartiality in terms of its
procedural, ethical, and political dimensions—each with distinct
schemas for regulation that vary across and within jurisdictions—
illuminates the relationship between judicial process, ethics, and politics
and reveals an architecture for conceptualizing impartiality that solves
some of the puzzles introduced in this Article.
A. The Imponderables Revisited
This Article began with Lillian Hellman’s observation that
“[n]obody outside of a baby carriage or a Judge’s chamber can believe
in an unprejudiced point of view.”266 Putting the infants to one side (or
at least down for a nap), judges may well “believe” themselves
unprejudiced. After all, judges “persistently and adamantly deny that
their fact-finding or legal interpretations are motivated by their
personal . . . preferences.”267 Moreover, even if judges are influenced
by their prejudices, cognitive psychology offers an explanation,
traveling under the name “motivated reasoning,” for why judges may be
sincere in their belief that they are not so influenced.268 After two
millennia of evidence to the contrary, however, it is too late in the day
to make categorical claims that judges are literally impartial in the sense
of being devoid of prejudice or bias. Hellman made her observation in a
book review: unlike fiction writers, she explained, “the historian or
biographer . . . must make sure . . . that the people he is writing about

265. See Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial Independence, in
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROOSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 9, 16–22
(Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002).
266. Hellman, supra note 4.
267. C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS 147 (1996).
268. Motivated reasoning posits that a decision maker’s ideological and other motivations
affect her reasoning process in ways that persuade her to favor legal arguments for preferred
outcomes. See EILEEN BRAMAN, LAW, POLITICS, & PERCEPTION: HOW POLICY PREFERENCES
INFLUENCE LEGAL REASONING 13–40 (2009) (outlining the theory of motivated reasoning and
exploring potential weaknesses); Lawrence Baum, Motivation and Judicial Behavior:
Expanding the Scope of Inquiry, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 3, 5 (David
Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010) (summarizing the development of the attitudinal model of
judicial behavior); Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal
Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 541–42 (2004) (exploring motivated reasoning in
several contexts where facts were distorted to ensure a desired outcome).
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are not the victims of his loving or unloving heart.”269 Thus, even if it is
impossible to have an unprejudiced point of view, she concluded,
“simply in self-interest, the biographer must try for one.”270 Perhaps the
same may be said of judges: even if a completely impartial perspective
is unattainable, we must still insist that judges—aided by those who
oversee judicial systems—“try for one.” In short, perfect impartiality
remains the ideal, while “impartial enough” is the pragmatic objective.
That objective is dimension-dependent, in that the impartiality needed
to give parties an acceptably fair hearing can differ from that needed to
ensure an acceptably ethical judge, which, in turn, can differ from the
impartiality necessary to preserve an acceptable degree of public
confidence in the judiciary.
Once the inevitability of imperfect impartiality is acknowledged, it
becomes possible to unpack the quandary presented by Judge Walker
deciding the same-sex marriage case. Insofar as Judge Walker’s
perspective is informed by his experience as a homosexual, the same
can be said of the heterosexual judge. To the extent that these
differences in perspective are characterized as forms of bias that can
influence a judge’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause in the
context of a gay marriage case, they are ubiquitous. And in the
procedural dimension of impartiality, which is constrained by the need
for an ample supply of judges to decide cases, universal disqualification
would be impracticable. Whether a judge is gay or straight, Christian or
Jewish, male or female, black or white, may well exert a more
significant extralegal influence on judicial decision making in certain
kinds of cases than, say, whether the judge owns a few shares of stock
in a corporate party. But from a practical perspective, disqualification
procedure depends on more or less bright lines and limited applications.
Hence, disqualification for stock ownership presents a manageable
disqualification rule, while disqualification for affiliation with a given
race, gender, ethnicity, or sexual orientation—absent specific statements
or conduct indicative of bias in a particular case—does not. Moreover,
absent such particularized evidence of bias, the right of parties to an
impartial hearing in the procedural dimension is not compromised but
arguably furthered by the diversity of perspective that comes from
judges with varying backgrounds. If one accepts the premise that there
is often no one “correct” answer to many of the difficult questions
judges decide, and that the exercise of discretion is therefore inevitable,
then as long as a judge’s race, gender, ethnicity, or sexual orientation
informs her discretion without overriding her commitment to follow the
law, diversity of perspective can level the ideological playing field for
269. Hellman, supra note 4.
270. Id.
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litigants.
Judge Pickering’s scenario addresses the flip side of the same coin.
A judge’s political ideology may influence her decision making to an
even greater extent than her race or gender, but like the influence of
gender or race, ideology furnishes neither a necessary nor manageable
basis for disqualification in the procedural dimension.271 The political
dimension, in contrast, is unencumbered by the same constraints and is
less concerned with ensuring litigants a fair hearing than it is with
preserving the public’s confidence in the impartiality of its judiciary.
Hence, the Senate may challenge the impartiality of nominees in light of
racial, gender, or ideological biases that would not call the judge’s
impartiality into question in disqualification proceedings.272 For
example, it is difficult to imagine that Justice Sotomayor could be
disqualified from race and gender discrimination cases on the grounds
that her impartiality might reasonably be questioned because she once
said that her status as a Latina woman influences her decision
making.273 And yet, in confirmation proceedings, the Senate devoted
considerable attention to whether that very statement would undermine
public confidence in her impartiality to an unacceptable degree.274 The
same point can be made of Judge Pickering: ideological predilections
that would have little bearing on Judge Pickering’s impartiality in a
disqualification setting nonetheless called his impartiality into question
during his Senate confirmation proceedings.275
The Senate’s rejection of Judge Pickering’s nomination to the Fifth
Circuit underscores how much ideological orientation has to do with a
judge’s impartiality in the political dimension, where a nominee’s
commitment to impartially uphold the law is measured with reference to
whether the judge’s views on legal issues are politically acceptable. In
that setting, the judge who shares her views risks undermining her
perceived impartiality with the public and being rejected by the Senate
for that reason. It is thus understandable that as a nominee Judge Scalia
declined to take public positions on issues he was likely to decide as a
Justice, on the grounds that doing so could compromise his
impartiality.276 Conversely, in Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White,277 when Justice Scalia opined on behalf of the Court that a
judge’s predilections on questions of law had nothing to do with his
impartiality, he did so in a case that fell squarely within the ethical
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

FLAMM, supra note 9, at § 10.7.
See, e.g., Davis, supra note 85.
Id.; FLAMM, supra note 9, at § 10.3.
Davis, supra note 85.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, supra note 12, at 58.
536 U.S. 765 (2002).
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dimension of impartiality.278 At issue was whether the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s interest in preserving impartiality by disciplining
judicial candidates who announced their preexisting legal views
trumped the candidates’ First Amendment freedom of speech.279 In that
setting, Justice Scalia approved one definition of impartiality (lack of
bias for or against a party) and possibly a second (open-mindedness),
but explicitly rejected a third: “lack of preconception in favor of or
against a particular legal view.”280 With respect to the latter, the Court
explained that preexisting views on legal questions were indicative of a
good and learned judge, not a partial one.281 The Minnesota Supreme
Court’s ultimate argument was, in effect, that a good judge is an
impartial judge is an open-minded judge, and that candidates who
announce their views compromise their open-mindedness—an argument
the Court rejected on the grounds that the announce clause did not
further the state’s purported interest in an impartial, open-minded
judiciary.282
Put another way, in the ethical dimension, declining to share one’s
thoughts on legal questions during judicial campaigns is not a defining
feature of an impartial qua ethical judge. It may, however, remain an
issue for an impartial qua fair judge in the procedural dimension, insofar
as judges who share their views in ways that appear to pre-commit them
to decide future issues in specified ways may be subject to
disqualification.283 And in the political dimension, declining to share
one’s views can be a near-prerequisite for an impartial qua politically
acceptable judge. The problem in the political dimension is not that
judges who announce their views appear closed-minded to Senators in
confirmation proceedings or to voters in judicial elections—although
judges who decline to express their views often worry aloud that they
do not want to compromise their impartiality in the procedural
dimension by appearing to pre-commit themselves before parties have
an opportunity to be heard.284 The core problem in the political
dimension is that the substance of a judicial candidate’s views is fodder
for campaigns that attack the candidates as activist or excessive in ways
that belie the candidate’s commitment to impartially upholding the law.
And so, Judge Scalia kept his counsel during confirmation proceedings,
and incumbent state judges likewise decline overtures to announce their
views in judicial campaigns, notwithstanding their First Amendment
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id. at 776–77.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 775–78.
Id. at 777–78.
Id. at 778–81.
MODEL CODE, supra note 92, R. 2.11(A)(5).
See Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, supra note 12, at 58.
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right to do otherwise.285
Which brings us to the problem presented by Twombly286 and
Iqbal,287 in which the Supreme Court has reinvigorated the pleading
process by subjecting complaints to dismissal if they do not allege a
plausible claim—an assessment that the Court has instructed judges to
make with reference to their “common sense” and “experience.”288 By
encouraging judges to make plausibility assessments prior to discovery,
the Court has weakened a procedural impediment to premature
judgment. Insofar as plausibility “may lie in the eye of the beholder,”289
the new standard invites judges to act on their predispositions to the
detriment of their impartiality. For example, one recent study confirmed
that there has been a statistically significant change in dismissal rates in
black plaintiffs’ claims of race discrimination post-Iqbal.290
The debate over pleading standards turns on the question of whether
the costs and delays of discovery—constraints under which impartiality
is regulated in the procedural dimension—trump the benefits of
protracting the litigation process to better guard against prejudgment
and the perils of judges bringing their prejudices into play at the outset
of the litigation. In Twombly and Iqbal, the Court answered that
question in the affirmative. The implication underlying these decisions
is not that impartiality is expendable, but that it is expensive, and that a
pleading standard that tolerates a bit more prejudgment in exchange for
a bit less cost and delay yields a process that is “impartial enough” for
the procedural dimension.
B. Trends in the Regulation of Impartiality
The relevance of Twombly and Iqbal is not limited to their use as a
foil for understanding how impartiality is regulated in the procedural
dimension. Anger over those decisions piqued congressional interest, a
development that is representative of a larger trend. When recent events
in the regulation of impartiality are compartmentalized into their
applicable dimensions, a pattern emerges that reveals a gradual
movement away from regulation in the procedural and ethical
dimensions toward regulation in the political dimension.

285. See CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
41 (2009) (finding no statistically significant post-White impact on contestation rates in judicial
elections).
286. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
287. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
288. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
289. Arthur Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 36 (2010).
290. Quintanilla, supra note 239, at 30–42.
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Returning briefly to Twombly and Iqbal, two consequences followed
naturally from the Supreme Court’s decisions. First, by changing the
pleading standards on its own, the Court effectively foreclosed
resolution of the question in the procedural dimension by means of the
largely intra-judicial Rules Enabling Act.291 That is so because, as a
practical matter, it is unlikely that the Judicial Conference would
challenge the conclusion of its presiding officer, the Chief Justice (who
voted with the majority in both cases),292 and nullify Twombly and Iqbal
by promulgating a new rule that could only become effective with the
approval of the Supreme Court—the Supreme Court that authored the
cases the new rule would overturn.293 As a consequence, the question of
pleading standards reform in the aftermath of Twombly and Iqbal has
moved to Congress in the political dimension, where it has become a
hotly contested issue.294 Second, by giving district judges greater
latitude to dismiss complaints they deem “implausible” on the basis of
their “common sense,” the Court has increased the discretion of judges
to act upon their predilections in ways that invite more sustained inquiry
into such questions during confirmation proceedings. To date, district
judges have largely avoided the highly politicized confirmation
showdowns that have plagued Supreme Court and circuit court
nominees.295 To the extent that “plausibility” is in the eye of the
beholder, however, it may only be a matter of time before the “common
sense” of district court nominees is tested in the appointments crucible.
A comparable movement from the procedural to the political
dimensions has occurred in the disqualification arena. An ironic
impediment to regulating impartiality through rigorous enforcement of
disqualification rules in the procedural dimension is that the procedures
courts typically follow to implement those rules can compromise the
perceived impartiality that disqualification rules seek to promote. In the
federal system, and in many states, judges whose disqualification is
sought decide the matter for themselves.296 Appellate review is
available, but, with rare exception, appellate courts employ a highly
deferential standard of review,297 which proceeds from the dubious
premise that when deciding whether a judge is or appears to be too
biased to hear a matter, we should defer to the assessment of the judge
291. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77 (2006).
292. Id. § 331.
293. Id. § 2074(a).
294. Videofile: Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?, U.S.
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hea
ring.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735da1540e6d.
295. GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE, supra note 209, at 214.
296. See ABA Judicial Disqualification Project, supra note 133, at 16.
297. Id.
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who allegedly is or appears to be too biased to hear the matter.298
Moreover, on courts of last resort, judges typically have the first and
final word on their own qualifications to sit, and may err on the side of
non-disqualification if there is no means to replace them when they
withdraw.299 Insofar as being impartial is a defining feature of the
“good” judge in the ethical dimension, judges who implement
disqualification rules in the procedural dimension would seem to have a
personal interest in the outcomes of challenges to their own impartiality.
As a consequence, many lawyers have long been reluctant to seek
disqualification of judges, who are unlikely to second-guess their own
impartiality and who may take umbrage at the suggestion that their
impartiality is in doubt.300
For their part, judges have pushed back against efforts to reform
disqualification procedure, arguing that such reforms are unnecessary
and burdensome—core efficiency concerns that constrain the regulation
of impartiality in the procedural dimension.301 In 2007, the American
Bar Association (ABA) launched the Judicial Disqualification Project,
which was aimed at “taking [judicial] disqualification seriously.”302 The
Project’s 2008 preliminary report proposed six specific reforms to
“diminish or eliminate the need for targeted judges to rule on motions
for their own disqualification.”303 Two draft resolutions followed that
sought to implement the recommendations of the draft report,304 but
were withdrawn following objections from the ABA’s Judicial Division,
among other ABA entities.305 A third resolution proposed simply that
“each state should have in place clearly articulated procedures . . . for
the handling of disqualification determinations” that “should be
designed to produce resolution of disqualification issues that are both
prompt and meaningful.”306 Even that, however, drew Judicial Division
fire,307 and the call for prompt and meaningful determinations was
298. Id. at 16–17.
299. See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 915–16
(2004) (Justice Scalia explained his disinclination to err on the side of disqualification, given the
risk of a 4–4 tie on the Court.).
300. Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters, supra note 117, at 700–01.
301. ABA Judicial Disqualification Project, supra note 133, at 17.
302. Id. at 12. I served as Director of and consultant to the ABA Judicial Disqualification
Project from 2007 to 2009. The views I express in this Article are mine alone, and not
necessarily those of the ABA Judicial Disqualification Project, the ABA Standing Committee on
Judicial Independence to which I reported, or the ABA itself.
303. Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial Disqualification Project, Report of the Judicial
Disqualification Project 59 (2008) (on file with the author), available at http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/judicial_independence/jdp_geyh_report.authcheckdam.pdf.
304. ABA, DISCUSSION DRAFTS (RES.?) (on file with the author).
305. Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters, supra note 117, at 727–28.
306. ABA, DISCUSSION DRAFT (July 16, 2010) (on file with the author).
307. Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters, supra note 117, at 727–28.
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replaced by a fourth resolution, which the ABA ultimately adopted, for
“prompt review by another judge or tribunal, or as otherwise provided
by law or rule of court, of denials of requests to disqualify a judge”308—
which, given the universal availability of appellate review could fairly
be characterized as endorsing the status quo.
With efforts to reinvigorate the administration of disqualification
rules in the procedural dimension languishing, activity in the political
dimension has filled the void. The House Judiciary Committee held
hearings on judicial disqualification in 2009 that focused on
disqualification procedure.309 A 2009 survey found that over 80% of the
public thought that disqualification requests should be decided by a
different judge than the one whose disqualification is sought.310 Interest
groups and the media have tapped into the public’s skepticism of
judicial self-disqualification with several highly publicized campaigns
to pressure Supreme Court Justices into recusing themselves in highprofile cases. Calls for Justice Scalia’s disqualification in the duck
hunting imbroglio of 2004 were followed by campaigns to disqualify
Justices Thomas and Elena Kagan from participating in a case
challenging the constitutionality of health care legislation, because of
alleged conflicts attributable to the activities of Justice Thomas’s spouse
on behalf of organizations opposed to the legislation, and Justice
Kagan’s role in the development of the legislation while Solicitor
General for the Obama Administration. Meanwhile, Justice Stephen
Breyer announced his view that disqualification concerns were
overblown and that the disqualification of Justice Thomas presented a
“false issue.”311 As previously noted, there are longstanding ethical
directives against judges making public statements on pending or
impending cases.312 That Justice Breyer saw fit to make such statements
here simultaneously underscores the diminished status of
disqualification relative to other issues in the legal process, and the
308. ABA, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION AND DISCLOSURE RESOLUTION 107 (2011),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/judicial_ independenc
e/report107_judicial_disqualification.authcheckdam.pdf.
309. Examining the State of Judicial Recusals after Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Competition Pol’y of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong., 1st Sess. (2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_091210_2.html.
310. Lissette Villarruel, Poll: Public Wants Firewall Between Judges, Election Backers,
GRAVEL GARB (Feb. 23, 2009), http://www.gavelgrab.org/?p=877 (finding that 81% of U.S.
adults thought that a different judge should decide disqualification motions).
311. Robert Barnes, A Health Law Warm-up Fight for High Court, WASH. POST, Nov. 28,
2011, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
312. U.S. COURTS, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3(A)(6) (2011)
(“A judge should not make public comment on the merits of a matter pending or impending in
any court.”), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/CodesOfConduct/CodeCo
nductUnitedStatesJudges.aspx.
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elevated status of disqualification in the political process.
Arguably, the Supreme Court’s decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co.313 revitalized impartiality in the procedural dimension by
characterizing non-disqualification in the teeth of probable bias as a
Due Process Clause violation.314 The impact of Caperton, however, is
sharply limited by the constraints under which the Due Process Clause
regulates judicial impartiality.315 As previously explained, such
constraints relegate due process challenges to the status of a last resort
reserved for nippy days in hell.316 The Caperton majority emphasized
that non-disqualification will violate due process only in outlier cases,
when judges exhibit a flagrant probability of bias that inexplicably
manages to evade capture by standard disqualification rules—rules that
require recusal whenever a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.317 In short, the impact of Caperton is likely to be largely
symbolic.
There is likewise evidence of a gradual movement away from
regulation of impartiality in the ethical dimension and toward
heightened interest in the political dimension. A primary constraint on
the robust operation of disciplinary mechanisms in the ethical
dimension is that those mechanisms are implemented by and for judges
who are predisposed to presume themselves impartial.318 In the federal
system, that constraint has rendered the lower federal courts susceptible
to criticism that the disciplinary process is underenforced and that the
Code is underutilized.319 Such criticism has piqued congressional
interest, thereby shifting the locus of attention to the political
dimension. Thus, in response to the latest wave of concern, the House
held oversight hearings on the disciplinary process;320 members of
Congress investigated the conduct of judges whose disciplinary
proceedings have stalled,321 with an eye toward possible impeachment;
the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee introduced legislation to
313. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
314. Id. at 883–90.
315. Id. at 889–90.
316. See supra notes 126–130 and accompanying text.
317. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 886–90.
318. See supra notes 198–199 and accompanying text.
319. See, e.g., Lise Olson, Judging the Judges: Veil of Secrecy Stirring Calls for Change,
HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 31, 2009, at A1.
320. The Operations and Federal Judicial Misconduct and Recusal Statutes: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (culminating in the proposal of The Judicial Improvements Act
of 2002, H.R. 3892, 107th Cong. (2002)).
321. Impeaching Manuel L. Real, Judge of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal.,
for High Crimes and Misdemeanors: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and
Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 90 (2006).
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establish an inspector general to investigate disciplinary complaints
against judges;322 and Senators, frustrated by the Judicial Conference’s
failure to regulate the ethics of judges attending educational seminars at
vacation resorts, underwritten by corporations interested in the
outcomes of cases those judges decided, introduced bills to ban “junkets
for judges.”323
The Supreme Court, in contrast to the “inferior courts,” is not subject
to any disciplinary process, other than impeachment, and has no code of
conduct to which it has bound itself.324 Chief Justice Roberts has
explained that Justices on the Court do in fact consult the Code just as
district and circuit court judges do,325 which is not the same as saying
that they have bound themselves to follow the Code as lower courts
have. Thus, for example, Justices Scalia and Thomas were featured
speakers at the 2012 annual meeting of the Federalist Society, which
would seem to have violated the Code of Conduct as construed by the
Judicial Conference.326 The vacuum created by the absence of a Code to
regulate the Court in the ethical dimension has been filled in the
political dimension with a campaign launched by the media and interest
groups, questioning the ethics and perceived impartiality of individual
Justices, decrying the absence of a Code that applies to the Supreme
Court, and calling for reform. At the same time, a group of preeminent
scholars have called attention to the under-regulation of the Supreme

322. H.R. 5219, 109th Cong. (2006); Bruce Moyer, Proposals Resurface to Create a
Judicial Branch Watchdog, FED. BAR ASS’N (Mar./Apr. 2011), http://fedbar.org/Advocacy/Was
hington-Watch/WW-Archives/2011/MarchApril-2011.aspx.
323. Fair and Independent Federal Judiciary Act of 2003, S. 787, 108th Cong., 1st Sess.
(2003).
324. See Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and the
Procedural Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107, 111 (2004).
325. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 2–
4 (2011), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.pdf.
326. U.S. COURTS, COMMITTEE ON CODES OF CONDUCT, ADVISORY OPINION NO. 46 (2012)
(“The Commentary to Canon 4C states that ‘[a] judge may attend fund-raising activities of lawrelated and other organizations although the judge may not be a speaker, a guest of honor, or
featured on the program of such an event.’ When a judge is chosen to receive an award, it would
appear likely that the judge would be either a ‘guest of honor’ or a ‘speaker’ at such an event.
Additionally, the judge should consider whether the judge’s presence is being employed as a
device to promote publicity and the sale of tickets.”), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Vol02B-Ch02.pdf. The annual dinner
would seem to be a “fundraising activity” in the obvious sense that the Federalist Society wants
revenues from ticket sales to exceed costs, and so will sell as many tickets as possible by
promoting the Justices as featured speakers. There are good reasons to relax this restriction (the
Model Code has, in Rule 3.7(A)(4)), particularly for Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court whose
appearance as featured speakers at such events can enrich public understanding of the Court and
its Justices. The point, for purposes here, however, is that Justices Thomas and Scalia felt
unencumbered by the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges, which retains the restriction.
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Court in the procedural and ethical dimensions and called for reform.327
Among the states, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White
diminished the constitutional authority of state supreme courts and
judicial conduct organizations to regulate the political speech of judges
in the name of preserving judicial impartiality. Insofar as the ethical
propriety of judges appearing to prejudge cases from the campaign
stump remains an issue, it is an issue relegated by default to the political
dimension.328 And so, in the post-White era, judicial campaigns have
featured an awkward ballet, in which interest groups have asked judges
to state their views on issues they may decide; and when judges demur,
citing impartiality concerns, the groups have sought to make a campaign
issue of the judges’ intransigence.329
This trend in the regulation of impartiality that I have sought to
isolate—away from its procedural and ethical dimensions and toward
the political—yields a new perspective on longstanding, if diffuse,
complaints within the legal establishment that the judiciary is being
overly “politicized.” It is too late in the day to take calls to
“depoliticize” the judiciary seriously, when social science learning and
public opinion have converged on the conclusion that judges exercise
discretion that is subject to ideological and other political influences.330
In short, we must recognize that regulation of judges and their
impartiality in the political dimension is an inevitability. One may
nonetheless worry about excessive politicization, when pieces of
impartiality that are arguably better reserved for regulation in the
procedural and ethical dimensions are commandeered by the political
dimension. For those who share such concerns, the three-dimensional
schema proposed here offers a possible path to reform: regulatory
recapture by the ethical or procedural dimensions from the political.
One example should suffice. In the past decade, when Congress
intruded upon the ethical dimension with threats to legislate against
“junkets for judges,” insinuate an inspector general into the judiciary’s
disciplinary process, and launch retaliatory impeachment inquiries, the
327. Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. et al., Four Proposals for a Judiciary Act,
PAULCARRINGTON.COM (Feb. 9, 2009), http://paulcarrington.com/Four%20Proposals%20for%
20a%20Judiciary%20Act.htm.
328. About half the states have adopted a rule in the ABA Model Code that calls for the
disqualification of a judge whose public statements “appear to commit” the judge to reaching a
particular result in a future case, but that rule does not address the ethical propriety of making
such statements in the first place.
329. Terry Carter, The Big Bopper: This Terre Haute Lawyer is Exploding the Canons of
Judicial Campaign Ethics, 92 A.B.A. J. 31, 32–34 (2006) (characterizing the message sent by
questionnaires as: judge, you can no longer hide behind the code of judicial conduct, in light of
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in White, and if you decline to answer what my client
constituency wants to know, it will most likely cost you their votes).
330. Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive?, supra note 59, at 244–45.
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Judicial Conference responded by retaking the regulatory initiative.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist established a Commission to evaluate
the disciplinary process, which published a candid and sometimes
critical self-assessment that culminated in proposed reforms that the
Judicial Conference promptly adopted.331 At the same time, the Judicial
Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct revised its advisory
opinion on participation in and reimbursement for judicial participation
in educational activities to address some of the core concerns
underlying legislation aimed at so-called “junkets.”332 The gambit
quieted congressional critics: no legislation was enacted, no formal
impeachment investigations progressed, and the regulatory center of
gravity remained within the ethical dimension and the Judicial Branch.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to develop a normative theory to
evaluate which dimension is best suited to take the lead in regulating
what impartiality problems. For purposes here, it is enough to note that
the interdimensional balance is fluid and subject to negotiation and
compromise.
CONCLUSION
Over the course of the past fifteen years, judicial independence has
been richly theorized in symposia, books, and articles. This Article
represents an initial effort to do the same for judicial impartiality. By
reconceptualizing judicial impartiality in three dimensions, and
applying this three-dimensional schema across a range of applications, I
have sought to situate impartiality at a critical crossroads, where judicial
procedure, ethics, and politics meet.

331. THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT STUDY COMM., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980: A REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, 239 F.R.D.
116, 126 (2006), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/breyercommitteereport.
pdf.
332. U.S. COURTS, COMMITTEE ON CODES OF CONDUCT, ADVISORY OPINION NO. 67 (2012),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/
Vol02B-Ch02.pdf.
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